Imputability as the Subjective Element of Crime

Abstract

Imputability as the subjective element of crime denotes, first of all, that we can impute a certain act to a person as its author. In the Church there is a close relationship between criminal and moral responsibility, therefore he or she can be considered responsible for such behaviour that is at the same time contradictory with a moral norm, i.e. it is a grave sin, manifested and causing harm.

There must be a more profound causative relationship between an illegal act and its agent – this act must be completely his or her own, he or she must be morally imputable. For someone to be considered imputable, his or her act must bear the signs of human action – actus vere humanus. The agent will bear this attribute when he or she is aware of it and the action results from his or her free will.

In CIC of 1917 the church lawgiver pointed out that for a crime to come about the criminal law must be violated by a person morally imputable, that is, morally culpable (moraliter imputabilis legis vel praecepti violatio). Now in the CIC of 1983 the lawgiver resolves that an external act is socially harmful only when it can be submitted to punishment and is the agent is gravely imputable (sit graviter imputabilis) and culpable.

The principle in can. 2199 CIC of 1917 pointed to two sources of imputability: dolus et culpa. The definition of deliberate guilt is contained both in the old and the new Codes of Canon Law. In the sources of the ancient law deliberate guilt was defined in different ways. It was often denoted by the terms propositum, deliberatis consultum scentia, malitia, fraus. The second source of criminal imputability was an inadvertent guilt (culpa). It is a just ignorance of the law that has been violated (ignorantia legis violatae), or omission of due diligence (omissio debitae deligentiae). Error or inattention are identified with ignorance.

The basic principle of criminal responsibility, as contained in the CIC of 1983, is the rule that all crimes committed with deliberation are submitted to this responsibility. Inadvertent crimes are punished only when their criminality is clearly marked in the law or criminal order. One may therefore notice an essential difference between the regulation of this issue in the old and the new Code. Moreover, in can. 2200 par. 2 CIC of 1917 presumption of deliberate guilt was assumed, a fact that was in line with the ancient canonical tradition. In can. 1321 par. 3 of the new CIC we find only presumption of imputability.