WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE ANCIENT GREEK PARTICLE δή – THE CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

The particle δή is one of the most commonly occurring particles in Ancient Greek texts. At the same time, it is one of the subtlest and most elusive of particles. We may easily be led to suppose that for a word so frequently appearing, its exact function should be known for sure and little doubt should exist regarding its semantic meaning. Yet, its function is still not fully evident nor it is transparently known what force it brings to the utterance. As in the case of many particles in Ancient Greek, δή is also a topic of scholarly disagreement. There is, however, one established fact. Although many details of the characteristics of δή remain the subject of uncertainty, the scholarly consensus accepts it now as a modal particle, i.e. as a particle by means of which a speaker signals his own attitude towards the proposition he presents.

In this contribution, I will provide a survey of relevant previous research on δή and I will present the existing descriptions of this particle in various authors and genres and at different stages of Ancient Greek. At least three motivations underlie this paper. First, I would like to complement and up-
date bibliography from previous studies on δή, as Ancient Greek particles represent a dynamic area of research with a flood of new publications. Furthermore, it is necessary to systematize older accounts and put them together in a comparative perspective. Lastly, this paper aims at providing points of reference for further research on δή by establishing its convergent points and suggesting a framework for further analysis.

1. SICKING & VAN OPHUIJSEN – EVIDENTIALITY

Sicking and van Ophuijsen describe the general value of δή as ‘evidential sentence particle’ in the sense that it presents a statement as immediately evident or obvious to the understanding of both a speaker and an addressee, such as in:

Ἐχεκράτης: αὐτός παρεγένου Σωκράτει…ἢ ἄλλου του ἤκουσας;
Φαίδων: αὐτός, ὦ Ἐχέκρατες.
Ἐχεκράτης: τί οὖν δή ἔστιν ἅττα εἶπεν…

(Plato, Phaedo 57a)

Echecrates: Were you with Socrates yourself (…) or did you hear about it from someone else?
Phaedo: I was there myself, Echecrates.
Echecrates: Then what did he say?

(translated by Fowler)

The particle οὖν is used by the speaker (Echecrates) to indicate the transition from one step in the conversation to the next one, which is, however, logically connected to the preceding context, whereas the particle δή marks that this next question is immediately evident considering the interlocutor’s answer.

Sicking and van Ophuijsen indicate that the evidential force of δή is also to be recognized in the examples where it classifies a statement as a common knowledge, such as in:

ἔστι δὲ νέος: φοβούμεθα δὴ περὶ αὐτῶ

(Plato, Euthydemus 275b)

He is young; and so we have fears for him

(translated by Lamb)
He is young, so it is evident (as it is commonly understood) that we are worried about him.

Although δή appears to function as a “relatively dialogical particle”\(^1\) (Duhoux 22), it is also common in non-dialogical texts, in which it displays its evidential value:

οὕτω δὴ οὗτοι μὲν…ἐπέπαυντο.

(Herodotus 1.83)

Then, they ceased their efforts.

The Spartans are ready to provide their assistance to Croesus when the message comes that he has already been captured by the Persians. In such a circumstances it was evident that they put their efforts on hold.

According to Sicking and van Ophuijsen the speaker uses thus δή to suggest that he has a common ground with his addressee. In other words, a speaker assumes that the addressee has been prepared for what he is going to hear either by what has been said before or by the common knowledge he and the speaker share about the world. Against this background the use of δή was outlined by Sicking\(^2\) and van Ophuijsen in their joint study comprising two monographs devoted to the Greek particles with the title *Two Studies in Attic Particle Usage. Lysias and Plato*. Sicking discusses particles as ‘articulating devices’ in Lysias 1 and 12, van Ophuijsen, on the other hand, deals with particles found in Plato’s *Phaedo*.\(^3\) Both authors have adopted a deliberately pragmatic approach, “taking advantage of what modern linguistic research has to offer without at the same time neglecting what many generations of scholars from Hoogeveen to Denniston have contributed to our understanding of Ancient Greek particles” (van Ophuijsen and Sicking 176).

In his contribution Sicking offers, as an appendix, an investigation on the value and use of the so-called ‘interactive’ particles. Under this heading he puts the use of δή. The scholar observes that this particle serves primarily an interactive use rather than the one of text articulation. He speaks of the interactive particles as of “the instruments by which a speaker may direct

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\(^{1}\) Duhoux points out that δή occurs as a “relatively dialogical particle” (22-29). He indicates, however, that it is more common in prose than in drama and includes it in the list of connective particles and he believes it to have been more typical of the written language. Cf. George 164-166.

\(^{2}\) The use of δή has been similarly analysed by Sicking in other publications: “Griekske parti-kels,” “Partikels in Vragen bij Plato,” “Particles in Questions in Plato.”

\(^{3}\) The discussion focuses on, but is not restricted to Plato’s *Phaedo*. There is an ‘excursus’ on ἄρα in Herodotus.
and indeed manipulate the interaction between himself and his audience, in particular by taking into account what pragmatic information it had previously, and anticipating its possible responses” (“Devices” 51). Sicking offers an accurate description of δὴ with reference to the explanation given by Denniston. The scholar recalls that the use of δὴ is brought by Denniston under the headings ‘emphatic’ and ‘connective’ and is put on a par with the use of μήν. 4 Sicking indicates that the use of δὴ is different from that of μήν. This distinction is, however, possible to grasp by incorporating the addressee into the description of the use of these specific particles and by taking into account the communicative situation in which they occur. By using δὴ the speaker implies that he and the hearer are in the same position with regard to the statement being made. This feature led Sicking to assign even the ‘socializing’ function to δὴ, as it “brings into relief the information which is shared by the interlocutors” (“Devices” 52) and since it strives to mark a successful interaction. 5

In his contribution Sicking confines himself to examples found in one dialogue of Plato – Phaedo, which exemplifies “the aptness of δὴ to convey to the hearer the speaker’s suggestion that the two of them share information, in a wider sense including opinions.” (“Devices” 52). This use of δὴ is to be seen in:

εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὄντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δὴ ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι
(Plato, Phaedo 91 B 2-3)

If what I say is true, I am (evidently) the gainer by believing it.

(translated by Fowler)

4 Denniston states that “it is difficult to grasp the exact difference in sense between μήν and the much commoner δὴ” (The Greek Particles 330). Both particles display the emphatic and the connective force. The connective force of δὴ implies temporal or logical connection, or something between the two, which labels δὴ as progressive in the sense that “it marks the progression from one idea to a second of which the consideration naturally follows” (238-239). According to Denniston the connective force of μήν implies its adversative and progressive use, in the case when it “adds a fresh point, marks a fresh stage in the march of thought” (336). The emphatic value of δὴ is interpreted by Denniston as it “denotes that a thing really and truly is so: or that it is very much so” (204). According to Denniston these interrelated characteristics makes it difficult to evaluate the precise meaning of both particles in a sufficient way.

5 Although μήν is beyond the scope of this study, it seems worthwhile to mention Sicking’s account on this particle, since it is put in opposition to the use of δὴ: “with μήν on the other hand the speaker shows himself aware that his audience may not be inclined to accept the statement, and indicates that he will nevertheless uphold it. It thus implies the possibility of a distance between the two” (“Devices” 52).
Sicking points out that a rendering of δή by ‘evidently’ is here the most appropriate one. Interestingly, he notices that the use of this specific particle in the statement of Socrates, since he is the speaker here, is motivated by the interest he aims at; that is for the addressee to be persuaded to accept the truth of the principle here enunciated, just as Socrates himself is committed to it. The scholar assumes thus that the particle δή serves as an instrument by which a speaker may direct or manipulate the interaction between himself and his audience, since at least in this particular example the use of δή “seems to be motivated less by an urge on the part of the speaker to call attention to the evident character of the, in itself trivial, statement” (“Devices” 52).

The value of δή as a device used to mark the evident character of a statement is more clear in the following example given by Sicking:

μόνον δή τὸ αὐτὸ κινοῦν…οὔποτε λήγει κινούμενον.

(Plato, Phaedrus 245 C7)

Only that which moves itself (…) never ceases to move.

(translated by Fowler)

Sicking explains that δή marks here the evident character of this statement and adds that this evident character is to be seen in the light of what precedes, as it serves as the starting point for the following inferences of Socrates: “Socrates as it were ‘cashes in’ the commitment of his audience to what will provide the foundation for his next construction”6 (“Devices” 52).

6 I will argue at this point for the explanation that δή is used here to mark the evident nature of a statement, which is, however, evident in view of what has been said before: “And the beginning of our proof is as follows: Every soul is immortal. For that which is ever moving is immortal but that which moves something else or is moved by something else, when it ceases to move, ceases to live. Only that which moves itself, since it does not leave itself, never ceases to move, and this is also the source and beginning of motion for all other things which have motion. But the beginning is ungenerated”. This interpretation adheres to the examples for which Sicking indicates that δή conveys an appeal to the information that has just been referred to and thus may be perceived as shared information, such as in: οὗτός (…) δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν (Plato, Phaedo 59 B6): “Of native Athenians there was this Apollodorus.” The character of Apollodorus has just been mentioned (59 A8): οἶσθα (…) τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ “you know him and his character”, so that, in Sicking’s view, the speaker assumes that the addressee knows who he is talking about; or in: ὡς οὖν εἶδεν ἡ Ξανθίππη, ἀνηυφήμησέ τε τὸν ιόντα ἄττα εἶπεν, οὗτος δὴ εἰσόθησεν αἱ γυναῖκες (Plato, Phaedo 60 A4): “Now when Xanthippe saw us, she cried out and said the kind of thing that women always do say,” where the speaker takes it for granted that the information alluded to is immediately evident to the addressee.
The particle δή is thus clearly characterized by an interactive component, which has led Sicking to consider it as typical of dialogical texts, appearing mostly in Plato and tragic poets and, consequently, to describe it as an evidential particle. Against this background δή marks the information as immediately evident to the addressee or presents it as a common ground in the interaction. Interestingly, as Sicking takes it, this common ground between a speaker and a hearer may consist in their attitude with regard to the information or it may simply consist in the availability of the information as such. This particular view is shared by van Ophuijsen, who groups the evidential use of δή under several headings, which reflect accordingly different aspects of the common ground shared by a speaker and a hearer.

Van Ophuijsen appears to be in complete agreement with Sicking. His definition is a restatement of the interpretation given by Sicking and runs as follows: “δή presumes that the addressee – who is supposed to have the same relevant information at his disposal as the speaker – is ready and willing to commit himself to what is being stated; (...) the point of adding δή is to hint that the addressee is actually bound to subscribe to the statement as much as the speaker is” (“The Linguistic Articulation” 82). Van Ophuijsen lists then five categories of evidential use of δή: (1) the category of quoting, when δή appears in quotations of one’s interlocutor’s own words; (2) the category of naming, when δή is used to allude to the name of, or a proper word, for a thing, mentioned in the description; (3) the category of empirical use, when δή serves to refer to a commonly known empirical fact; (4) the use motivated by the speaker’s previous words, in the light of which the current notion must be perceived as evident; (5) self-evidential use of δή in the sense that it marks the statement, which is supposed to be self-evident and the hearer is induced to accept it as such.

The definition of δή given by van Ophuijsen integrates two pragmatic variables: “the ostensible commitment of the speaker to the statement he is making and the agreement which the speaker presupposes on the part of, or

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7 Sicking presents two examples of the use of δή as an evidential particle outside Plato: “Another case in point is the entrance, in Aeschylus’ Persians 159, of the Queen Atossa taking her clue from the anxiety just expressed by the chorus (εἴ τι μὴ δαίμων παλαιὸς νῦν μεθέστηκε στρατῷ) with the words ταῦτα δὴ λυποῦσ’ ἱκάνω... “That in fact is precisely why I have come”. In Eur. Med. 68 too πεσσοὺς προσελθών, ἐνθα δὴ παλαίτεροι θάσσουσι the particle conveys an appeal to shared information: “the place where, as you know...” (“Devices” 53). The author also quotes a few instances from Aristophanes’ Acharnians, which may suggest that also in ordinary language the use of δή in certain contexts was relatively frequent.

8 Van Ophuijsen illustrates the application of δή in Plato’s Phaedo.
admits to be expecting from, the addressee” (“The Linguistic Articulation” 82). These factors are also to be recognized in the description of δή which van Ophuijsen gives for its occurrence in argumentative context. Contradicting Denniston’s account on ‘progressive’ δή which “expresses something intermediate between temporal and logical connexion, and marks the progression from one idea to a second of which the consideration naturally follows” (The Greek Particles 239), van Ophuijsen states that for the occurrence of δή in arguments it is essential to recognize that the self-evident character of the statement is supported by the preceding statements, regardless of the presence or absence of any coordinator or connector.

The challenge is, however, whether the theory presented by Sicking and van Ophuijsen can properly account for all the instances of δή. Other research presented below shows that the hypothesis of ‘evidentiality’ has been based on fragmentary evidence and does not take into account many other uses of δή. The supposed ‘evidentiality’ marked by δή appears to be only one among many different uses of δή and cannot be convincingly shown to be present in many cases. For an explanation of this, let us now turn to another approach to δή introduced by Gerry C. Wakker.

2. WAKKER – SPECIAL ATTENTION AND INTEREST

The next pragmatically oriented study within the framework of which the semantic value of δή has been introduced, was conducted by Gerry C. Wakker. The author discusses δή in three of her works. Although none of them has δή as its main topic, Wakker formulated several very relevant remarks as to the characteristics of this particle contradicting Sicking and van Ophuijsen. Since the question underlying this paper is how scholars define δή, Wakker’s proposal deserves closer scrutiny at this point.

Although several core ideas applying the main assumptions of Functional Grammar can already be traced back to her earlier works (Wakker, 9 Wakker, Conditions and Conditionals; “Emphasis and Affirmation”; “Modal Particles.” 10 Functional Grammar is one of various linguistic theories, that have been developed as an alternative option to Transformational Grammar (FG). This theory has been invented by Dutch linguist Simon Cornelis Dik and was then presented by the author in his book Functional Grammar, published in 1978. The theory of FG has been further improved, since in the meantime it has met with many positive reactions in scholarly circles. In 2008 Functional Grammar was succeeded by Functional Discourse Grammar (FDG). However, FDG arose in response to intensive discussion of its predecessor theory, Functional Grammar. These theories share the common
“Conditionals”), Wakker explicitly chose this grammatical model as the theoretical framework of her work in 1994. In that year she published the monograph *Conditions and Conditionals: An investigation of Ancient Greek*, in which she developed a linguistic basis to analyse the conditional sentences in Ancient Greek using the apparatus of Functional Grammar. In her study Wakker gives a detailed analysis of conditionals, in which she describes the syntactic, semantic and the pragmatic factors in order to explain the various uses of conditional clauses. One chapter of Wakker’s study is completely devoted to various particles found in conditionals.

Wakker indicates that particles are often used to modify the conditionals in Ancient Greek. She assumes that by adopting a functional perspective it is possible to show that each of the particles appearing in conditional clause has its own meaning. Applying the FG division of the clause into several levels,11 Wakker makes a distinction between the use of various particles with regard to different syntactical domains or scopes that may be characterized in terms of various FG levels. Furthermore she points out that particles found in conditionals are not interchangeable, contradicting at this point Denniston.12 Hence, Wakker assumes that each particle has its own function, including the particle δή.

Wakker lists δή among the particles that modify the proposition presented in the utterance. These particles serve to define the attitude of the speaker with regard to the proposition and the supposed knowledge and expectations of the addressee and may be then called modal or attitudinal particles. The author based then her definition of δή on the one proposed by Cornelis J. belief that most formal properties of languages can best be understood if they are brought into correspondence with semantic and pragmatic categories that are rooted in human thought and in communication.

11 Wakker states: “In my opinion, the FG levels (predicate, predication, proposition, illocution and discourse) are relevant here as elsewhere, in that particles may have different syntactical domains or scopes, which may be defined in terms of the different FG levels” (*Conditions and Conditionals* 305).

12 Denniston claims that particles do have synonyms, by which they can be replaced without affecting the understanding of the whole utterance (*The Greek Particles* 223). At this point the criticism has been voiced by many scholars. Although Wakker indicates that Denniston’s monograph is invaluable, she also explicitly argues for a more detailed description of individual particles. Notably, she makes also a very pertinent remark on Denniston’s definition of a particle as ‘a word expressing a mode of thought, considered either in isolation or in relation to another thought, or a mood of emotion.’ She suggests that this description may be interpreted as the one that considers language as a means of expression of thoughts and emotions of a speaker exclusively, whereas many valuable insights on Greek particles may be obtained by incorporating the addressee into the description (*Conditions and Conditionals* 304).
Ruijgh, according to whom δή marks in principle “l’importance du fait nouveau qui est le contenu de la phrase” (Autour 646). Reformulating this description, Wakker comes up then with her own definition: “In other words, δή draws special attention to the (important and interesting) proposition presented. As such δή may be paraphrased by means of such expressions as French ‘voici’, Dutch ‘zie hier’, ‘let wel’, English ‘look how interesting’ etc.” (Conditions and Conditionals 351). Wakker herself sees, however, the shortcomings of this definition and admits that it is not without a considerable degree of ambiguity. She points out that a speaker may in fact have different reasons for demanding special attention to the utterance he makes. That is why “the value of δή is not very specific and depending on the context δή may express widely different semantic nuances” (Conditions and Conditionals 351).

Remarkably, Wakker does not agree with Sicking and van Ophuijsen that the ‘evidentiality’ marked by δή can be proposed as the basic meaning of this particle. She states that this semantic nuance is to be found only in specific contexts and seems to be a later development of δή. Wakker explains that although δή is often found in conclusions and other assertions which are observable, immediately understandable or generally known facts, its basic meaning is still to draw the addressee’s special attention to this conclusion or assertion instead of marking its evidentiality. Wakker indicates that “the addressee may as it were observe with his own eyes that the proposition is true and δή gets therefore the nuance ‘obviously’, ‘as you see’, ‘clearly’, and the like” (“Modal Particles” 240). She argues, however, that we should not be misled to assign this ‘obviousness’ or ‘evidentiality’ to δή as its general or basic meaning.

Wakker develops this account on δή in her later work devoted to modal particles in Herodotus and Thucydides. Her paper focuses exclusively on Herodotus’ and Thucydides’ use of modal particles in indirect speech. Wakker proves that depending on the context δή may express a number of different nuances and that the general function of δή (drawing special attention to the – important or interesting – proposition presented) is rather vague. Remarkably, the opposition between Wakker’s theory and the account on ‘evidential’ δή recurs when Wakker states that

even though van Ophuijsen departs from a basic meaning that is different from mine (‘the basic value of the particle relates to what is visible to the mind’s eye as well as to the organ of sight’, 1993:141), he gives a paraphrase comparable to mine: ‘looki,’ ‘here you havei,’ and compares it with French: ‘voici’ and ‘voilà.’ (“Modal Particles” 240)
The question remains on what basis then Wakker’s and Ruijgh’s theory that δή marks in principle ‘l’importance du fait nouveau qui est le contenu de la phrase’ can be harmonized with the notion of ‘evidentiality’, ‘obviousness’ and ‘common ground’? Can these two theories be interrelated when one separates the occurrences of δή in declarative sentences from its use in interrogatives and commands? The convergent point of such an analysis may be the theory that was an indisputable starting point to the later definitions of δή, viz. the account of Denniston.

3. DENNISTON – AFFIRMATIVE EMPHASIS, CONNECTION AND IRONY

At this point let us thus give some consideration to the account of Denniston’s description of δή. Denniston lists δή among the particles that “express a mode of thought in isolation” (The Greek Particles 37). He indicates that this particle primarily carries emphasis and tends to cohere with the preceding word(s). This emphasis, Denniston specifies, is an affirmative emphasis “denoting that something really and truly is so” (The Greek Particles 38). When he proceeds to give the full account of δή, he defines this particle as follows:

The essential meaning seems clearly to be ‘verily’, ‘actually’, ‘indeed’. The particle δή denotes that a thing really and truly is so: or that is very much so (...). These meanings run through all the non-connective usages of the particle: and the connective use is easily derived from them. (The Greek Particles 203-204)

Additionally we thus find δή as a connective particle which “like οὖν, expresses post hoc and propter hoc, and anything between the two, tending on the whole to denote a less strictly logical sequence than οὖν” (The Greek Particles 237). It should be mentioned here that the existence of δή as a connective particle is usually denied. 13 In fact, sometimes Denniston himself has doubts as to whether δή in particular cases displays its emphatic or connective force. 14 Furthermore, he comes up with the third use of δή under the heading ‘ironical.’

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13 Cf. e.g. van Ophuijsen and Sicking 148-151.
14 Denniston notes: “In tragedy, owing to the free employment of emphatic δή, and the less stringent need for connexion between sentences, it is often difficult to determine whether δή is connective or emphatic” (The Greek Particles 237). He begins his discussion on καὶ δή with the words: “this combination is sometimes connective, ‘and indeed’, sometimes non-connective, ‘also indeed’, ‘actually indeed’. Some cases admit of classification under either head” (The Greek Particles 248).
The reader may be thus easily confused by the lack of one synchronically adequate basic meaning of δή. The hundreds of individual examples Denniston gives for each of the use of δή are obviously an helpful aid when it comes to illustration of a wide range of possible meanings of δή that can vary dramatically depending upon the context and it is precisely for that reason that Denniston’s account proves an effective tool for the analysis of each individual case.

Nevertheless, there is, I think, scope for some improvement. Denniston presents the necessarily encyclopedic material. The object of his compendious work was in principle to collect examples, and from them briefly and yet clearly to explain the use of the particle δή. However, he does not attempt to give a too refined account or a too minute clarification for the examples he gives. He points out and illustrates the occurrences of δή but fails to present the detailed interpretation of the context in which it occurs. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, Denniston does not pay sufficient attention to the fact that “it is the communicative situation in which the utterance takes place that primarily determines its form, rather than the free choice of the speaker” (Wakker, *Conditions and Conditionals* 304). Our understanding of the particle δή may considerably profit by taking into consideration the pragmatic factors of the communication and the fact that language is primarily a means of communication between speaker and addressee. Besides, the lack of the interpretation of the context of each individual occurrence of δή provides little insight into the concept that is, in fact, emphasized by this particle. Denniston mentions merely that “like γε, δή normally emphasizes the preceding word” and adds tentatively that it “is bound to the relevant word by a looser bond and is more able to spread its influence over a whole clause” (*The Greek Particles* 204). Hence, although Denniston’s work deserves much praise, there is clearly still room for improvement. In their research the scholars attempt to deal with these problems when presenting their own account on δή, contradicting sometimes the one of Denniston. Now, I will turn to the definition of δή expounded in grammatical handbooks and dictionaries.

4. Δή IN GRAMMATICAL HANDBOOKS AND DICTIONARIES

It is a curious fact that Sicking and van Ophuijsen’s theory of evidential δή and Denniston’s account that the essential meaning of this particle seems to be ‘verily,’ ‘actually,’ ‘indeed’ bear resemblance to the definition of this
particle expounded in Kühner’s and Gerth’s *Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache*:

\[ \Delta \dot{h}, \text{ von gleicher Wurzel mit dem lat. } \text{iam}, \text{ got. u. ahd. ju, jetzt, schon, lit. jaú, schon, ja, mit denen es auch im Gebrauche vielfach übereinstimmt, hat ursprüng-} \]
\[ \text{lish temporale Bedeutung } = \text{ schon, nunmehr; aus dieser entwickelte sich die bildliche, in der es auf bereits (iam) Bekanntes, Offenbares, Augenscheinliches hinweist } (\ldots). \ (123) \]

However, both Denniston and Sicking and van Ophuijsen reject the derivation of evidential \( \delta \dot{h} \) from a temporal basic meaning. In fact, much discussion in the past has centred around the etymological derivation of this particle. Wilhelm von Baümlein in *Untersuchungen über griechische Partikeln* countenanced the alternative theory of the possible derivation:

\[ \text{Es kann keinem Zweifel unterliegen, dass } \delta \dot{h} \text{ mit den Sanskritthemen diw, diwa Himmel, dju Himmel, Tag, divan, divas Tag, dēva Gott, daiva göttlich, mit den lateinischen Wörtern dium, Dia, dies, diespiter, deus, divus, den griechischen } \delta\upiota(\piτης), \Delta\omegaς, \delta\omicronς \text{ zu einer Familie gehört, und zwar durch Abfall des Digamma und Gunirung des i ent-} \]
\[ \text{standen ist. } (\ldots) \Delta \dot{h} \text{ steht also da, wo etwas als klar, am Tage liegend, offenbar, entschieden bezeichnet werden soll, und wird dann überhaupt gebraucht, um dem Gedanken (der Behauptung, Frage, Forderung, dem Wunsche) größeren Nachdruck zu geben. } (98) \]

The theory of a temporal basic meaning of \( \delta \dot{h} \) is shared by Liddell–Scott–Jones who describe \( \delta \dot{h} \) as the particle which “gives greater exactness to the word or words which it influences” (*A Greek-English Lexicon*, s.v. \( \delta \dot{h} \)).

In grammatical handbooks from the 19\textsuperscript{th} century two main traditions concerning the original meaning of \( \delta \dot{h} \) can be thus discerned. On the one hand scholars held that \( \delta \dot{h} \) originally had a temporal meaning like (\( \tilde{\eta} \))\( \delta \dot{h} \), and on the other hand they emphasized an etymology comparable to the word \( \delta \dot{h}(\lambda\omicron\varsigma) \). It is a striking observation that even though these two etymological derivations are obviously different, the meanings of \( \delta \dot{h} \) which are considered to find their roots in these incompatible etymologies are surprisingly similar to each other – \( \delta \dot{h} \) marks the ‘obviousness’. This characterisation of \( \delta \dot{h} \) forced its way into the grammatical handbooks of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. The following description may be found in Herbert W. Smyth’s *Greek grammar*:  

\[ \text{...} \]
Δή (...) marks something as immediately present and clear to the mind, and gives greater precision, positiveness, and exactness. It sets forth what is obvious, acknowledged, and natural, and often corresponds to *voilà*. (646)

The etymological dictionaries of Ancient Greek language provide us mostly with the same definitions of δή. Pierre Chantraine in his *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* notes that δή is:

particule emphatique <*voilà que, justement*>, employée aussi avec une valeur ironique, à la seconde place de la proposition pour marquer une progression; après des adjectifs et adverbes, des superlatifs, des pronoms, des interrogatifs, des relatifs, etc. (270)

and rejects its temporal derivation:

Le problème qui ne peut guère être tranché est de savoir si la particule comportait originellement une valeur temporelle, ce qui n’est pas probable. (270)

Hjalmar Frisk in *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* defines δή as “hervorhebende Partikel <eben, in der Tat, gerade>” and supposes that it is a “Kasusform (Instrumentalis?) eines Demonstrativums; es wäre dann mit lat. *dē*, air. *dì* ‘von-weg, von-herab’ formal identisch” (376).

In *Étymological Dictionary of Greek*, Robert Beekes describes δή as “emphatic particle <even, indeed, right>” and adhering to Frisk he indicates that δή is “perhaps a case form (instrumental?) of a demonstrative; it would be identical with Lat. *dē*, OIr. *dì* ‘away from’” (322).

Yet, as we have seen, many scholars rejected the notion of temporality and that of obviousness as the core meaning of δή. They consider the notion of ‘emphasis’ or ‘grösseren Nachdruck’ as the meaning which underlies all the uses of this particle. If we review present scholarship on δή we discover that researchers argue against one basic semantic meaning of δή. They propose instead a variety of different usages of this particle based on its occurrence in particular contexts and discursive segments.

The authors of the recently published first full-scale reference grammar of Classical Greek in English in a century, i.e. *The Cambridge Grammar of Classical Greek*, Evert van Emde Boas, Albert Rijksbaron, Luuk Huitink, and Mathieu de Bakker, present an innovative section on textual coherence that treats particles and discusses several examples in detail, indicating new ways of approaching Greek texts. When discussing the particle δή they note at the very beginning that “δή has a particularly wide range of uses. Its basic
function is difficult to ascertain, and the subject of considerable scholarly
debate” (686). They point out that the postpositive δή “indicates that the
speaker considers (and invites the addressee to consider) the text segment or
word (group) which it modifies as evident, clear, precise. [...] δή in such
cases indicates that the word or word group in question is entirely or
evidently applicable (in fact, actually, very, precisely, indeed, or translated
by emphasis)” (686). Moreover, the authors observe that δή can sometimes
modify entire clauses in order “to present the content of the clause as clearly
true or relevant (certainly, indeed; often with a nuance of obviousness:
obviously, of course, clearly)” (687). Remarkably, they mention that “in
many such cases, δή appears to have developed a connective function, indi-
cating a transition to a new, obviously relevant segment (then, well, now,
so)” and that in certain cases (in causal clauses, purpose clauses, com-
parative clauses etc.), “the sense ‘evidently’ is often used with an ironic or
sarcastic nuance (I’m sure, obviously, apparently, no doubt)” (687).

As we have thus seen, as such δή may be paraphrased/translated by means
of many different expressions:

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<tr>
<td>verily, actually, indeed</td>
<td>voilà, justement</td>
<td>eben, in der Tat, gerade</td>
<td>evidently, look, here you have, voici, voilà</td>
<td>evidently, hier, let well, look how interesting, obviously, as you see, clearly</td>
<td>voici, zie even, indeed, in fact, actually, right</td>
<td>verily, evidently, in der Tat, gerade, voilà, justement, eben, in der Tat, gerade</td>
<td>verily, evidently, in der Tat, gerade, voilà, justement, eben, in der Tat, gerade</td>
<td>verily, evidently, in der Tat, gerade, voilà, justement, eben, in der Tat, gerade</td>
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5. THE MOST RECENT SCHOLARSHIP ON δή

The most recent investigations that have been carried out on δή have been mostly marked by a pragmatic approach. Interestingly enough, this approach has won full recognition in particular among Belgian and Dutch scholars. The insights generated discourse-pragmatic analysis have been incorporated into the study on δή most recently by Ever van Emde Boas (Tragic Evidentiality?, 2005), Stephanie van der Pas (“The normal road to geometry,” 2014), Anna Bonifazi, Annemieke Drummen, and Mark De Kreij (Particles in ancient Greek discourse, 2016), Raf van Rooy (“The Relevance of Evidentiality,” 2016), Rutger J. Allan (“Pointing to Common Ground in Dramatic Dialogue,” 2020), and Kees Thijs (Polysemous particles in Ancient Greek, PhD thesis on Greek attitudinal particles and their relation to perspective shifts, 2021).

Stephanie van der Pas in “The normal road to geometry: Δή in Euclid’s Elements and the mathematical competence of his audience” studies the use of δή in Euclid’s Elements. She aims to “gain insight into his [Euclid] interaction with his audience through a characterization of the use of δή in the Elements” (558). At the very beginning she states that “according to Wakker’s interpretation, we would expect δή to mark important steps in the proof. The argumentation of Sicking and van Ophuijsen leads us to expect δή in obvious, perhaps self-evident steps in the proof” (559). After analysing the five main uses of δή (proceeding to the next step in the proof; transferring from a general enunciation to a specific proof-setting;
δή in analogous cases; δή in exclusive disjunctions; δή in rephrasing), she discusses a few isolated uses of δή, which do not occur in standard context. However, as the author herself mentions, the function of δή in most of these isolated cases is compatible with the uses grouped in the five main categories. The final discussion leads the author to establish the primary function of the particle δή. Van der Pas emphasizes primarily the interactive nature of this particle and indicates that the occurrence of this particle in specific contexts reveals what level of mathematical competence Euclid expects from his audience. She concludes that

most of the statements marked by δή are intended to help his audience follow the structure of the proof. Δή is found in statements notifying the audience of the case currently under consideration in the proof and, by using δή, Euclid communicates to his audience that he expects them to understand why the proof is proceeding in that direction at that point. (572)

Such an addressee-aimed function of δή is also posited in the work of Evert van Emde Boas. In *Tragic Evidentiality? A Study of δή in Tragedy*, he examines the occurrence of this particle in Greek tragedy. His research corpus consists of the surviving complete plays of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. From the material examined he draws the general conclusion that the core function of δή is “to signal the personal commitment of the speaker to the utterance (…) over which δή has scope” (25). Then he specifies that “in Tragedy the particle is used in many cases specifically to mark a shift in the discourse, by asking the addressee’s attention for a new, more important step” (25). Remarkably, he does not agree with Denniston that the ‘ironical’ use of δή is a separate use. He states that it is simply a rhetorically effective application of its basic function. However, as van Emde Boas is quick to admit, his discussion is far from exhaustive and many more nuances in the use of δή should be recognized.

The most recent study devoted to particles in Ancient Greek *Particles in ancient Greek discourse: Five volumes exploring particle use across genres* by Anne Bonifazi, Annemieke Drummen, and Mark de Kreij (2016) presents a great variety of different uses of δή proving that the interpretation of this particle is a complex matter and that there are still many aspects of the use of δή that require attention. Their study explores the particle use in epic and lyric – Homer and Pindar, in tragedy and comedy – Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides and Aristophanes, and in historiography – Herodotus and Thucy-
What we know about the ancient Greek particle δή

dides. Surprisingly, it does not include the author whose usage of particles is so remarkable that it cannot be simply ignored, viz. Plato. An exhaustive and a comprehensive study devoted exclusively to the use of δή in Plato and taking into account a wide variety of its usages from different perspectives and diverse interpretative layers is thus still a desideratum.

The latest published evidence on δή is the study “Pointing to Common Ground in Dramatic Dialogue: The Case of δή and τοι” by Rutger Allan, in which he analyses δή as a grounding device, that is, as the speaker’s instruction to the addressee how to relate the utterance to the common ground. In the conclusion Allan states that „it is certainly no overstatement that Greek particle research has been flourishing over the last two decades. Thanks to a number of significant studies, we are slowly getting to grips with these ‘intangible and elusive words’ – as Denniston called them in his preface to the first edition of The Greek Particles” (67). However, when it comes to δή it still seems that only parts of the many functions of this particle have been so far reflected in scholarly research. In the analysis, it seems worthwhile to also pay close attention to morphosyntactic aspects, viz. the (possible) combinations of δή with other types of words (other particles, adverbs, pronouns, etc.). Adopting this descriptive frame, one can possibly set out to characterize the types of uses of δή in many different syntactic-pragmatic frames.

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WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE ANCIENT GREEK PARTICLE δή


Δέγε δή:

WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE ANCIENT GREEK PARTICLE δή –

THE CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH

Summary

Although research has already established the function of the commonest Greek particles, there is a significant gap in the research on the function of δή in comparison with that carried out on other particles. Assigning a functional significance to this particle is problematic, especially since a satisfactory definition of the function of δή remains, I believe, a desideratum. The usage of the particle δή may appear at first sight to have little significance in Greek texts. This article aims to show that nothing could be further from the truth. The particle δή has had a considerable impact on the discourse. In line with this insight, in this contribution I present the way in which scholars have carried out their investigations into the particle δή. Specific attention is paid to (a) the question of how modern scholars classify this particle, (b) what kind of definition and characteristics they assign to this particle, and (c) what purpose this particle is intended to serve in the discourse according to current research. This paper also provides moot points in the research on the particle δή and ideas for further consideration. The main purpose of this paper is to
bring together a summary of the current published information about the particle δή for ready reference for those actively engaged in studying Greek particles.

**Keywords:** Ancient Greek particles; particle δή; the state of research; the discourse-pragmatic approach.

Λέγε δή:
CO WIEMY O STAROŻYTNEJ GRECKIEJ PARTYKULE δή – STAN BADAŃ

**Streszczenie**

Artykuł omawia sposoby definiowania funkcji partykuły δή we współczesnych badaniach nad partykułami greckimi. W istocie do badań nad partykułami greckimi nie udało się dotychczas wypracować skutecznej metodologii. Obiecujące pod tym względem są zwłaszcza badania naukowców z niderlandzkiego obszaru językowego (Belgia, Holandia), którzy do opisu greckich partykuł adaptują model pragmatyczno-dyskursywny, podkreślając, że funkcje partykuł należy interpretować, uwzględniając relacje między nadawcą i odbiorcą w specyficznym akcie komunikacji. Partykuły służą zatem przede wszystkim do realizacji funkcji pragmatycznych, a ich użycie jest determinowane kontekstem sytuacyjnym. Konkretną aplikację tych założeń można zaobserwować w pracach zagranicznych naukowców przedstawionych w niniejszym artykule. Systematycznych badań nad funkcjami partykuły δή do tej pory, o ile mi wiadomo, na gruncie polskim nie przeprowadzono.

**Słowa kluczowe:** partykuły greckie; partykuła δή; stań badań; model pragmatyczno-dyskursywny.