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PAST, PRESENT, OR FUTURE:
WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE?

Professor Tkaczyk lays out a sumptuous philosophical spread for our enjoyment, suffused in history and seasoned with contemporary analytic rigor. I am honored to have been invited to the banquet.¹ My contribution will consist of short discussions of propositions, events, the present, the relativity of time, and the sphere of culture.

PROPOSITIONS

There would seem to be an important asymmetry between the past and the future. The past is fixed: there is nothing one can do now to undo the past. The book on the past contains no gaps in its narrative. We can take comfort in its stable certainty. But that stability can also be a source of regret over irretrievably lost opportunities. We can be counseled not to cry over spilled milk, but no one would seriously advise us to unspill it. In contrast, some parts of the future, it is said, are still to be determined. The book on the future is not yet completely filled in. We count on the hope that many, perhaps most, of the future's narrative is already inscribed: gravity will still hold sway; the sun will rise tomorrow. But perhaps not all of the future's book is already chiseled in stone. There may or may not be a sea battle tomorrow: as Aristotle wrote, we would like to think that that eventuality depends on the deliberate choices of various sea captains. In commenting on Aristotle, Bo-

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¹ Marcin TKACZYK, "The antinomy of future contingent events," in typescript. References to passages from this work are embedded in the following text with the indication of the pages of the printed version – in this volume, pp. 5–38.

ethius seemed content to acquiesce in the fixity of the future except for one class of cases. When it comes to the origination of our deliberate actions, “we ourselves are the originators,” that is, nothing external to us—including, one presumes, the whole weight of the past—is their cause.²

There is a family of claims, each of which appears to be universally, omni-temporally applicable and logically unobjectionable, yet each of which induces an inconsistent triad when factored into beliefs about the asymmetry between past and future. Professor Tkaczyk calls attention to members of this family:

Bivalence: “every proposition has exactly one of the two logical values: the value of truth or the value of falsity.” (p. 12).

Excluded middle: “out of any two propositions one of which is the negation of the other at least one proposition is true.” (p. 12).

“[A] possible proposition is not followed by an impossible proposition.” (p. 13).

We might call this third member the “*Ab posse ad non posse non valet*” principle, except for the fact that its original text admits of two interpretations, duly noted by Professor Tkaczyk (pp. 13–4):

A possible proposition does not imply an impossible proposition.

and

A possible proposition does not become an impossible proposition later in time.

To be sure, the ambiguity of the notion of “following”—as logical consequence, as temporal sequence—generates the two interpretations. Professor Tkaczyk remarks succinctly that either interpretation “provides a possibility of constructing equivalents of any state of affairs” (p. 9). I suggest that that possibility is abetted by a source of indeterminacy that resides in the very notion of a proposition. We can examine the indeterminacy by considering the following two theses:

(P1) No proposition can undergo a change in its truth value.

(P2) No proposition can undergo a change in its modal status.

The case against (P1). “Not all propositions can vary over time. ‘All even numbers are divisible by 2’ is invariably true while ‘There is no prime number between 2 and 4’ is invariably false. But many propositions can shift from true to false, back to true, . . . as often as the world turns. Socrates is

² For details see KRETZMANN 1985, 23–50.

seated, then he arises, only to be seated again. One and the same proposition, 'Socrates is seated,' is true, then becomes false, then becomes true once more."

The case for (P1). "The above example helps itself to the assumption that different tokens of the sentence-type 'Socrates is seated' all refer to the same proposition. They do not. Communication is facilitated by our supposing that the tokens refer to the same subject, Socrates. But sameness of subject is insufficient to warrant sameness of proposition. 'Socrates is seated' is a *proposition-radical*, whose analysis reveals, in the case at hand, three more precise, time-indexed propositions, such as 'Socrates is seated at t_1 ,' 'Socrates is not seated at t_2 ,' and 'Socrates is seated at t_3 .'"

It seems to me that the disputants over (P1) operate with different conceptions of the notion of a proposition and its relations to temporal modifiers. I do not propose to settle the dispute. Instead, let me add to the merriment by suggesting that similar disagreement can arise concerning (P2).

The case for (P2). "Let us suppose that propositions can be sorted without remainder into three classes, those that are necessarily true, those that are necessarily false, and those that are contingent, that is, either true or false but neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. (P2) maintains that no proposition can be in one class at one time yet also be in another class at another time. It is important to note that (P2)'s claim does not depend on epistemological or doxastic uncertainties. Fermat's Last Conjecture was not proven until 1994.³ It would have been reasonable for a mathematician in 1990 to suspend judgment about the truth or falsity of the conjecture. But it would have been absurd for that mathematician to infer that in the absence of a proof (or disproof), Fermat's Conjecture was neither necessarily true nor necessarily false. It turned out that it was necessarily true all along, and its proof, though a feat of genius, was a discovery of that fact."

The case against (P2). "(P2) is false if there are possible propositions that become impossible propositions with the passage of time. Professor Tkaczyk points out that 'Because of the relative character of modality, the same state of affairs can have different modal characteristics in relation to different states of affairs—depending, among other things, on time' [p. 2]. He adverts to the case of Isaac irreversibly promising to bless only Esau, not Jacob. The promise is made in circumstances in which 'Isaac can and must legitimately fulfill the promise to Esau' was a possible proposition. Subsequently Isaac

³ Pierre de Fermat believed that there were no integer values for x , y , and z that would satisfy the equation, $x^n + y^n = z^n$, for $n > 2$. Andrew Wiles proved the Conjecture.

irreversibly but mistakenly blesses Jacob. Isaac is now in a position described by the impossible proposition ‘Isaac must (still) fulfill his promise to Esau but cannot now legitimately fulfill the promise.’”

One cannot help but wonder whether these two arguments for and against (P2) traffic in different conceptions of propositional necessity. The notion at work in the case against (P2) is a notion familiar to standard propositional and quantificational logic. One begins to build an artificial language with a vocabulary of terms (variables and constants, predicates and relations), and then builds well-formed formulas out of the vocabulary by means of truth-functional connectives and quantifiers. The austerity of the vocabulary and inferential rules facilitates, among other things, the construction and analysis of arguments comprised of formulas in order to see whether the arguments are valid or not. But the austerity comes with a cost. As so far developed, the language would treat, for example, ‘Socrates is seated at t_1 ’ and ‘Socrates is seated at t_3 ’ as inscrutably atomic, having no more to do with each other as ‘Socrates is seated at home’ has to do with ‘Socrates is seated at trial.’ It is natural to assume that our specimen sentences were intended to be temporally ordered, with t_1 specifying a time earlier than t_3 . But we have no warrant to read that off from the sentences themselves. Moreover, even to assume that much would not answer the question where the sentences stand with respect to past, present, and future. These sorts of considerations motivate the desire to investigate tense-modal logics. That investigation would carry us too far afield from the ambit of Professor Tkaczyk’s paper.

The other notion of propositional necessity that arguably lurks in the Isaac case is hard to depict with the precision that is the hallmark of deductive necessity. On this alternative notion Isaac’s plight is one of *deontic unavoidability*: Isaac cannot avoid doing something he ought not do. Investigation into it involves not only the resources of tense-modal logic but also deontic logic. If one seeks to avoid deontic unavoidability one may find some hope in one or the other of the following deontic strategies. *Mobilize the Kantian maxim that “ought implies can.”* Its contrapositive structure is “if agent A cannot perform action ϕ then A is not obligated to do ϕ ”: if Isaac cannot now bless Esau, then he now has no obligation to do so. *Argue that any agent’s presently unavoidable dilemma is always the result of some earlier culpable fault of the agent’s.* In Isaac’s case this strategy will maintain

that Isaac must have culpably failed to do something which, had he done it, would have avoided his present predicament.⁴

EVENTS

It is practically a truism that propositions pertaining to the past and the future are often expressed in the language of events. One might for philosophical reasons prefer the language of states of affairs. Professor Tkaczyk appears to regard the choice between states of affairs and events as merely semantic; he proposes to use “state of affairs” and “event” synonymously (p. 6). Speaking for myself, I find states of affairs a bit more mysterious than events. And all other things being equal, it seems eminently appropriate to frame an examination of future contingent *events* in the language of events. Events can be mysterious, nonetheless, in their own right. We should be aware of some of their mysteries, especially as they might affect future contingency. The mysteries I have in mind concern the identity and individuation of events. Here are three examples.

(1) “Colonel Moran shot at Sherlock Holmes in the middle of the night from an empty room across the street from 221B Baker Street with Von Herder’s air-gun.”⁵ How should this sentence be analyzed accurately? It will not do to parse it as a conjunction with three atomic conjuncts—“Colonel Moran shot at Holmes in the middle of the night and Colonel Moran shot at Holmes from an empty room across the street from 221B Baker Street,” et cetera—for the simple reason that Moran did not shoot three times. The original sentence describes *one* event, not three separate attempts. Moreover, the event described is *instantaneous*. Its whole content could be presented in a snapshot; no movie is required. What is desired is an account of how the event can be represented formally in all its complexity without fragmenting its instantaneousness.⁶

But not all events are instantaneous: (2) “Mrs. Hudson’s surreptitiously moving the wax effigy head of Holmes in the window convinced Moran that

⁴ I have doubts about the capacity of these strategies to dissolve all cases of deontic unavoidability. See MANN 2015, 269–295, and its Polish translation reprinted in *Roczniki Filozoficzne*, 65 (2017), no 4: 351–81. In particular, the Genesis 27 account of Isaac’s mistakenly blessing Jacob provides little to find fault with Isaac and much to criticize about Rebekah and Jacob’s duplicitous machinations.

⁵ The descriptions are inspired by Arthur Conan Doyle’s story, “The Empty Room.”

⁶ A classic discussion of these issues is DAVIDSON 2001.

he was looking at the real Holmes, causing him to load Von Herder's air-gun." This example illustrates "the accordion effect," so-called by Joel Feinberg because "an action, like the folding musical instrument, can be squeezed down to a minimum or else stretched way out." (FEINBERG 1974, 134). At a minimum Mrs. Hudson moved the head. We may suppose that her action deceived Moran; even that her action brought about his arming the air-gun. At some point, however, we may come to think that the accordion should stretch no further; that, for example, Mrs. Hudson's act was not responsible for Moran's firing the air-gun. But reasonable people can reasonably disagree about where the temporal boundaries should be located: how spread out in time can a particular action extend?

The first two examples were fictional. The third example is not.

The two World Trade Center towers in New York City destroyed on September 11, 2001 were insured for billions of dollars. Despite the fact that the two buildings were destroyed at different times by different airplanes, the insurers argued that the destruction constituted one event (or "occurrence"), not two independent events, thereby hoping to cut their exposure to financial liability in half. One can easily imagine the ingenuity of lawyers arguing both sides of this position. The example serves to show that concern about the individuation of events is not confined to philosophers.

THE PRESENT: TWO MYTHS

As befits them, instantaneous events occur in an instant, that ultimate residue of squeezing the temporal accordion. One is reminded at this point of Augustine's powerful dialectical exercise from *Confessions* XI, 15 (19–20): How much of the present century is present to us? Suppose we say that this year is present, acknowledging that the other years are either past or future, and hence not present. But not all of this year is present. If we find ourselves in September, then January through August are past and October through December are future. But September has thirty days. Each of those days is comprised of twenty-four hours; each of which in turn are comprised of divisible minutes. . . . At this point Augustine runs out of terms for further subdivisions. One can see where he is going. He does not shy away from the conclusion that what is present is durationless, for if it had duration it would still be divisible into past and future.

Augustine's argument encourages the thought that the present is a kind of relentlessly moving knife edge—an edge so keen that it has no width—that

separates past from future.⁷ This is the first myth about the present. I suggest that we can resist this depiction by balking at the argumentative procedure Augustine invokes. The procedure can be compared to a sorites paradox.⁸ A sorites paradox attaches itself to a vague term, for example, “heap,” and proceeds by arguing on the basis of an iterated inductive principle that there is no rational way to assign a point at which a heap ceases to be a heap. The principle is the seemingly unexceptionable proposition that removing one grain of sand from a heap of sand still leaves a heap. If we continue to reapply the principle enough times, we will reach the absurd conclusion that the one final remaining grain is still a heap.

Augustine’s argument also employs an inductive (and seductive) principle. The principle begins by presupposing that the term “present,” as normally used, is vague. Successive applications of the principle to shorter and shorter segments of any stretch of time are supposed to show that the stretch is inescapably infected with a past and/or a future.

We have been browbeaten in the name of precision. The literature on sorites paradoxes and the logic of vague terms is immense. Rather than contribute to that literature, I propose a simple observation and a practical circumvention. The inductive principles used to launch sorites paradoxes are not logical truths: denying their universal applicability does not expose one to a charge of contradiction. Moreover, one is free to choose a point at which one denies the further application of a particular principle. Upon being challenged to justify a choice of a cutoff point, one can appeal to common sense, community standards, legal precedence, aesthetic norms, whatever is relevant. The upshot is that there is nothing to constrain us to regard the present as durationless or aethically fixed.

Professor Tkaczyk writes that

In the context of the antinomy of future contingents present states of affairs are usually treated in the same way as the past ones. . . . This is because we treat the present, just like the past, as already closed or already effected. In spite of that, it should be clear that the considerations presented here retain their validity independently of whether such an assumption concerning the present state of affairs is in force. Additional di-

⁷ Augustine is aware of and troubled by the thought that “the past does not exist *now*” and “the future does not exist *yet*” entail, respectively, “the past does not exist” and “the future does not exist.” I wonder whether his worries about the past and the future are induced by his conception of the present.

⁸ Alternatively, one can compare Augustine’s argument with Zeno’s paradoxes about infinite divisibility.

stinctions associated with the physical meaning of time and relativistic physics can be passed over as irrelevant to the discussion. (p. 7)

There are two issues raised here that bear examination. One is the purported necessity of the present. This is the second myth about the present. The other issue concerns the alleged irrelevance of the “physical meaning of time and relativistic physics.” I shall turn to the second issue shortly. The second myth has an excellent pedigree. In the first sentence of chapter 9 of *De Interpretatione* Aristotle says that “With regard to what is and what has been it is necessary for the affirmation or the negation to be true or false.”⁹ It is easy to focus on only one-half of Aristotle’s claim here, namely that it is necessary for the affirmation or the negation to be true or false for what has been, and then to interpret this part of Aristotle’s claim as maintaining that the past is alethically fixed; nothing now can alter the truth values of sentences about the past. Aristotle himself notes, however, that some sentences about the past are what we might call “future-infected” sentences (*De Interpretatione*, 18b26 ff.): “It was true in 2017 that one thousand years from 2017 the entire state of Florida would be under water” is such a specimen. As a consequence, Aristotle notes, we need to allow that some sentences not purely about the past are presently neither true nor false (*De Interpretatione*, 19a7).

The other half of Aristotle’s claim, so easily overlooked, is that the present is as alethically fixed as the past. As he puts it a few paragraphs later, “What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not.” (*De Interpretatione* 19a23.) Professor Tkaczyk, wisely to my mind, remains uncommitted to this belief. If the past is a bit less settled than it initially seemed, why not allow a similar indeterminacy for *some* sentences about the present?

THE RELATIVITY OF TIME

Professor Tkaczyk claims that the physics of time is irrelevant to the project he has advanced. He may be correct. If so I will be wiser for being set straight. Here is a modern puzzle vaguely resembling the Esau/Jacob episode recorded in Genesis 27. Suppose that Alpha and Beta are identical twins, Alpha having been born first. Suppose further that the twins’ culture adheres

⁹ *Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione*, trans. J.L. Ackrill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 18a28.

to strict laws of primogeniture, dictating that upon the death of their father, his estate passes to the older son. Suppose further still that Alpha in his youth embarked on a mission of space exploration involving rocket speeds at a significant fraction of the speed of light. Years later Alpha's father dies shortly after Alpha returns to Earth. When Alpha claims his inheritance, Beta protests, arguing that he, Beta, is now the older son in virtue of having lived a longer life. A comparison of the extremely accurate clock kept on the rocket ship with an equally accurate clock kept on Earth reveals that indeed, Alpha's lifespan, measured physiologically, has slowed down, and that Beta's lifespan up to the present now exceeds Alpha's. Alpha's rebuttal includes reference to their birth times scrupulously recorded on their respective birth certificates. Beta concedes that Alpha was born moments earlier but insists that "older son" should be interpreted physiologically, not by birth order.

Professor Tkaczyk distinguishes between antinomies and paradoxes (p. 5). Antinomies spawn contradictions; paradoxes do not but nonetheless challenge our conceptual presuppositions. Beta has appealed to the "Twins Paradox," a consequence of the Special Theory of Relativity. What makes the Twins Paradox a paradox is that it is contrary to deep-seated intuitions we have about the uniformity of time. What makes it acceptable—indeed, rationally irresistible—is that the dilation of time at high velocities has been empirically confirmed.¹⁰

If the appropriate judges in the land of Alpha and Beta were to adjudicate between the twins' competing claims, they would inevitably need to confront the question of how to interpret the phrase "older son" in the laws concerning primogeniture. Alpha's lawyers argue that the statutes enshrine common-sense practices in place long before the development of relativistic physics; thus, there is no doubt that the legislative intent of "older son" could only have been defined by birth order. Beta's attorneys endorse Aristotle's point that human legislators are not clairvoyant. They must legislate using imprecise language, recognizing that they cannot foresee the novelty of cases arising from scientific and technological developments to which their laws might come to apply (*Rhetoric* I, 13). Original legislative intent is not always dispositive. To be sure, my story about Alpha and Beta is far-fetched. I shall argue, however, in the last section of this paper, that there is some theological interest in taking the relativity of simultaneity seriously.

¹⁰ Other paradoxes need not depend on empirical methods. One of the paradoxes of infinity is that the set of even integers is equinumerous with the set of integers.

THE SPHERE OF CULTURE

Professor Tkaczyk argues against diluting or rejecting the universal, omni-temporal principles that contribute to the third part of our trilemmas. Since these principles have the effect of denying any deterministic asymmetry between the past and the future, commitment to them leaves us with a dilemma: either abandon the thesis that the past is completely closed and off limits to subsequent change, or accept the thesis that the future is also completely closed. Professor Tkaczyk opts for the dilemma's first horn, claiming that its revision "leads to solving the antinomy of future contingents correctly and globally." (p. 29.) Realizing that this option may meet with incredulous stares, he deploys the following defensive steps. First, what is required is revision of the thesis that the past is unalterable, not outright rejection of that thesis. "None of what is past can be changed" is distinct from "Not all of what is past can be changed:" the latter but not the former claim is compatible with "Some of what is past can be changed." Second, point out that despite the views of philosophers as diverse as Aristotle and Hume, it has not been shown that retroactive causation is impossible. Third, suggest that retroactive causes can be found, not within the boundaries of science, but rather "in the sphere of culture, which, as a creation of human minds, is not limited by the existing laws of nature." (p. 33.)

The sphere of culture includes fictional literature, and at least since the publication of H.G. Wells's *The Time Machine* in 1895, the genre of science fiction has thrived in the thought of changing the past (and, for that matter, the future).¹¹ Sober souls will remind us that such fictions, though entertaining, provide no proof of the possibility of what they describe. Could it be, however, that there are other fictional exercises that are more likely to be effective in altering the past?

Eighteenth Century English law had responded to crimes against property by developing statutes against theft, the intentional removal of one's physical property by another's trespassing. In 1779 the inadequacy of that conception of theft was made evident by the case of *Rex v. Pear*. Pear rented a horse with the understanding that he would return it. Instead, he kept the horse. Pear had not trespassed on the owner's property, but he had nonetheless done something wrong. The problem was how to categorize Pear's actions as a case of theft. Herbert Packer describes the legal determination frankly:

¹¹ Stephen King's *11/22/63* (2011) is a recent contribution to the genre.

As was typical in the development of Anglo-American law, in this moment of tension a fiction was conceived. Pear's felonious intention, whenever it came into his mind, related back to the moment he rented the horse and made his taking of it trespassory. (PACKER 1968, 82).

This solution has all the advantages of theft over honest toil (pardon the pun). Although new legislation was needed to cover cases of theft by fraud, English legalists were averse to apply any such not-yet-existing law retroactively to Pear's case. Instead, they imputed to Pears an intention he had had all along, which made his actions "trespassory." This maneuver sets a precedent for future similar cases. One might try to argue that it also extends into the past. Suppose that in 1775 Apple had been acquitted of a crime similar in its legal details to Pear's. Then *Rex v. Pears* allows one to evaluate the following counterfactual conditional, "If *Rex v. Pears* had been in effect in 1775, then Apple would have been convicted." In general, any alteration of the law is apt to confer retrospective evaluation of various counterfactual conditionals.

Rex v. Pears is certainly an inhabitant of the sphere of culture. But is the fact that it raises counterfactual speculation sufficient to count as a case of changing the past? Suppose that jurists in 1780, emboldened by *Rex v. Pear*, decided to retry Apple's case. Surely Apple would argue that that would constitute a case of double jeopardy. If the trial proceeded nonetheless and Apple were convicted for what he had done in 1775, would that count as changing the past? It seems not: the 1775 acquittal would still be on the books, superseded by the 1780 conviction. And the realm of counterfactual speculation appears to be too feeble to be an engine of change.

It is difficult for me to submit this as a robust case of changing the past. But in conclusion I shall sketch one last attempt, in two stages, one natural, the other supernatural.

The first stage is to acknowledge the relativity of time with respect to an observer's inertial reference frame. That consequence of the Special Theory of Relativity was employed in the Alpha/Beta case.

The second stage can be introduced by Boethius's definition of eternity as "the complete possession all at once of illimitable life."¹² Only God is eternal by this definition, according to which God's life of supreme activity has neither beginning nor end yet does not proceed seriatim, from earlier to later. Creatures, in contrast, are timebound, living their lives from one moment to

¹² "Aeternitas . . . est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio" (*The Consolation of Philosophy*, 5). See also STUMP & KRETZMANN 1981, 429–58.

the next. Some creatures might even be temporally immortal—Boethius’s definition does not preclude that possibility—but immortality is not the same as eternity.

Omniscient God can survey all of creation, including all its temporal vicissitudes—pasts, presents, futures, dilations, and contractions—from a vantage point in which everything is equally, eternally present. Some may find this sketch of God’s eternal presence too impersonal. I shall not debate that issue here. I do want to call attention, however, to a ritual practice engaged in by many believers that makes sense, I think, only if we suppose that sometimes we can, with God’s cooperation, bring about the past in a fairly robust sense.

Sometimes people pray for things to have happened. Petitionary prayer can be directed not only toward the future, but also to the past. Knowing that the estimated time of arrival of the airplane carrying our loved ones has already passed, we pray nonetheless that it has landed safely on schedule. We pray that a friend’s surgery went well. These types of prayer are quotidian and typically made in ignorance of the time-sensitive facts. Skeptics will suggest that their function is merely to calm the nerves of the one who prays. But this need not always be so. One can pray for the souls of those who died long before one was born. I shall not try to defend the eschatological assumptions embedded in the latter sort of prayer. In conclusion I offer a way in which God’s eternity together with the relativity of time can make sense of retroactive prayers.

Suppose that Gamma has just successfully undergone an arduous surgical procedure by noon. Delta knows only that the surgery had been scheduled for today. At 6:00 p.m. Delta prays that Gamma’s surgery was successful. Delta’s praying took place six hours after Gamma’s surgery. But the two episodes are equally present to God’s eternal scrutiny.¹³ The fact that Delta’s prayer postdated Gamma’s surgery (in our time) makes the prayer seem pointless to us. It need not appear so to God; for God’s plans the prayer might weigh in the balance. It might be that without the prayer, the surgery would have had a different outcome.

The doctrine of God’s eternity is not a part of the sphere of scientific naturalism. To consign it to the sphere of culture is to beg a large question: it is to suppose that the sphere of that which is above nature is nothing but “a creation of human minds.” Let the argument begin.

¹³ Incidentally, here is another reason for theists to deny the myth that everything present is necessary: if everything is present to God, then everything is necessary.

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PAST, PRESENT, OR FUTURE: WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE?

Summary

This essay examines Marcin Tkaczyk's "The antinomy of future contingent events," with an eye towards clarifying the roles played by philosophical notions of propositions, events, the present, the relativity of time, and Tkaczyk's notion of a "sphere of culture." The essay concludes by examining what support might be offered for Tkaczyk's claim that people can to some degree change the past.

PRZESZŁOŚĆ, TERAŹNIEJSZOŚĆ, PRZYSZŁOŚĆ
— NA CZYM POLEGA RÓŻNICA?

Streszczenie

Artykuł analizuje tekst „Antynomia przyszłych zdarzeń przygodnych” Marcina Tkaczyka, skupiając się na wyjaśnianiu ról odgrywanych przez filozoficzne pojęcia zdań, zdarzeń, teraźniejszości, względności czasu i użytego przez Tkaczyka pojęcia „sfery kultury”. Tekst kończy się analizą kwestii, w jaki sposób można udzielić wsparcia tezie Tkaczyka, że ludzie mogą do pewnego stopnia zmienić przeszłość.

Key words: antinomy; future contingents; propositions; events; past; present; future; relativity of time; sphere of culture.

Słowa kluczowe: antynomia; futura contingentia; zdania; zdarzenia; przeszłość; terażniejszość; przyszłość; względność czasu; sfera kultury.

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