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A NEO-LOCKEAN THEORY OF THE TRINITY
AND INCARNATION

William Hasker’s work on the metaphysics of the Trinity and Incarnation is worthy of public celebration (HASKER 2013, 2017a, 2017b). Many have honored his work with critique. And Hasker has repaid the compliment with rejoinder. I wish to honor his work by offering a gift: a different theory of the Trinity and Incarnation that is in the same family as Hasker’s own.

THE DOCTRINES OF THE TRINITY AND INCARNATION

The doctrine of the Trinity implies, among other things, the following three claims: 1

(1) There is (only) one God.
(2) There are three divine persons (i.e., the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit).
(3) Each divine person is God.

These claims seem inconsistent: any two seem to imply the third’s negation. I call this problem—the apparent inconsistency of these claims—“the logical problem of the Trinity”. And I propose a solution: the Neo-Lockean theory of the Trinity, which applies a Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity.

The doctrine of Incarnation implies, among other things, the following claim: 2

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1 See the documents endorsed by the councils of Nicaea I and Constantinople I in TANNER (1990).
(4) In Christ, (only) one person (i.e., the Son) has two natures (i.e., the divine nature and a human nature).

The doctrine also seems to imply that:

(5) The human nature the Son assumes, which involves a human body and rational soul (with intellect and will), is intrinsically just like a complete human person. ³

St Gregory of Nazianzus, in his letter to Cledonius, writes: “The unassumed is the unhealed, but what is united with God is also being healed” (GREGORY 101.5)—a principle he uses to argue that the Son assumes not only a body but also a rational soul. This same principle seems to imply (5). It is, however, a highly plausible metaphysical principle that:

(6) Anything intrinsically just like a complete human person is a person.

Claims (4)–(6) seem inconsistent: any two seem to imply the third’s negation. The Son is discernible and so, it seems, distinct from the assumed human nature. If, however, the assumed human nature is a distinct person from the Son, then, in Christ, there are two persons, not one. I call this problem—the apparent inconsistency of these claims—“the metaphysical problem of Incarnation”. And I propose a solution: the Neo-Lockean theory of Incarnation, which again applies a Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity. Some theories of Incarnation try to solve the problem by denying (6). They say that, though the human nature is intrinsically just like a complete human person, it is not a person because it is assumed. What, however, is it for a human nature to be assumed? And why should being assumed disqualify something intrinsically just like a complete human person from being a person? I propose an alternative solution.

First, I present the Lockean theory of substances and persons and present some standard objections. Secondly, I present a Phenomenal version of the Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity, which avoids the previous standard objections. Finally, I apply that theory of personal identity to the doctrines

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² See the documents endorsed by the councils of Ephesus, Chalcedon, Constantinople II, and Constantinople III in TANNER (1990).
³ For a decisive case that the conciliar decrees imply that Christ has a concrete human nature, see PAWL (2016, chap. 2, sec. II.b, Nature).
of the Trinity and Incarnation. Before all this, however, let me disclaim. I myself don’t endorse this theory. It involves metaphysical principles I don’t accept. Nonetheless, the principles have some appeal and some adherents (Shoemaker 1984, Parfit 1984, Unger 1990, Noonan 2003, and Dainton 2008). And, for the sake of defending the coherence of the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation, it is important to articulate as many possible solutions to these problems as we can. Moreover, the specific version of the Neo-Lockean theory I use is a placeholder. There are other Phenomenal versions and there are non-Phenomenal versions of the Neo-Lockean theory. I want to show in some detail how such a theory can solve the doctrinal problems. But I don’t claim that this is the best version of the theory.

THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF SUBSTANCES AND PERSONS

John Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, book 2, chapter 27, has much to say about substances and persons. Outside this chapter, by “substance” Locke means thing that has modes and bears relations, but is neither a mode nor a relation. Call this “being”. In this chapter, though, Locke uses “substance” to mean fundamental being (Alston and Bennett 1988, 38; Bennett 2001, 330; Noonan 2003, 30). In this sense, he claims we have ideas of only three kinds of substance: God, finite spirits, and particles (Locke 2.27.2). What is it for a being to be fundamental? Locke never says. What he does say, though, suggests that, among beings, A is more fundamental than B if and only if B exists because A does (but not vice-versa), and so a being is fundamental if and only if nothing is more fundamental than it is (Hawthorne 2008, 264). For example, one might say that lines exist because the points that compose them exist (but not vice-versa). Plausibly then, if some As compose C or if B constitutes C, C exists because the As do or because B does (but not vice-versa), and so C is not fundamental. So, plausibly, any being either composed or constituted is not fundamental but any being neither composed nor constituted is fundamental. So, plausibly, in Locke’s sense, God, finite spirits, and particles are substances.

Locke holds that, in addition to substances, there are masses, organisms, and persons. Particles compose a mass if and only if the particles stand in the ancestral of contact; and masses are the same if and only if they are made of the same particles (Locke 2.27.3). Particles compose an organism if and

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4 The ancestral of a relation R is to R as being an ancestor of is to being a parent of.
only if the joint activity of the particles includes a life; and organisms are
the same if and only if they have the same life (LOCKE 2.27.4). So, in his
view, a mass is one thing and an organism is another, for their identity-
conditions differ. For example, an oak that grows from a small plant to
a great tree is the same oak. But the mass that constitutes it when it’s a small
plant isn’t the mass that constitutes it when it is a great tree.

Locke defines “person” as “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason
and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in
different times and places” (2.27.9). For Locke, a spirit constitutes a person
if and only if the activity of the spirit includes a consciousness; and persons
are the same if and only if they have the same consciousness (2.27.9). So, in
his view, a spirit is one thing and a person is another, for their identity-
conditions differ. For him, a consciousness is an event or process that in-
volves reflection of present ideas and memory of past ideas. An idea is what-
ever is the immediate object of perception or thought (1.1.8). Reflection is
perception of the internal operations of one’s own mind (2.1.4). And me-
memory is the power to revive an idea one had, along with the further idea that
one had that idea before (2.10.2). So, reflection unites the ideas a person has
at the same time and memory unites the ideas a person has at different times.

Locke thinks that every human being is an organism. So, in his view,
a human being is one thing and a human person is another, for their identity-
conditions also differ. For example, if a prince’s soul, which carries with it
the prince’s consciousness, enters the body of a cobbler, while the cobbler’s
soul departs, the person who was in the prince’s body is the person who is
now in the cobbler’s body, but the human being the prince’s body involved
isn’t the human being the cobbler’s body now involves (2.27.15).

Locke also asks whether spirits and persons can come apart. The question
has two parts. First, can different spirits constitute the same person at different
times? Secondly, can the same spirit constitute different persons at different
times? Locke thinks, for all we know, the answer to each question is “yes”.
If some spirit recollectively represents as done by itself some act another
spirit did, the person the one spirit constitutes is the person the other spirit
constitutes (2.27.13). For example, if the Mayor of Quinborough remembers
doing what Socrates did, the Mayor is Socrates, even if the spirit that
constitutes the one person isn’t the spirit that constitutes the same person.
They are the same person even if the spirits that constitute each are different
(2.27.19). And if some spirit has no memory of any act that same spirit did
earlier, the person that spirit constitutes isn’t the person that spirit con-
stituted earlier (2.27.14). For example, if Socrates alternates consciousness by day and night so that day-Socrates can’t remember what night-Socrates did, day-Socrates isn’t night-Socrates, even if the spirit that constitutes the one person is the spirit that constitutes the other person. They are different persons even if the spirit that constitutes each is the same (2.27.19, 23).

Locke’s account of consciousness, it seems to me, is a dead end. Reflection and memory don’t play the role in personal identity he thinks they do. Even if sufficient, reflection isn’t needed for personal identity at a time. A present idea could belong to a person even if it is neither an act of reflection nor an object of such an act. And even if sufficient, memory isn’t needed for personal identity over time either. A past idea could have belonged to a person even if it is neither an object of an act of recollection nor reflectively related to such an object. In any case, there’s a much better account of what a consciousness is, to which we soon turn.

It is worth saying, however, that there seems something right about Locke’s general approach to personal identity. If a prince’s brain, which carries his consciousness, enters the body of a cobbler, while the cobbler’s brain departs, the prince goes where his consciousness goes. Some would object here that since (very roughly) the brainstem is an organ of life and the cerebrum an organ of thought, the prince goes where the brain goes whether the prince’s identity-conditions concern sameness of life or consciousness. But we can imagine a creature that has an organ of life and a wholly distinct organ of thought. In that case, the organism goes where its organ of life goes, but the person goes where its organ of thought goes. It is, of course, more difficult to imagine that, though the cerebrums all remain, the prince’s consciousness enters the cerebrum of a cobbler, while the cobbler’s consciousness departs. Conceptually, however, it is the consciousness that determines the person’s identity, not the vehicle that happens to carry the consciousness. So, let’s pursue Locke’s general approach to personal identity but now add the superior account of what a consciousness is.

A NEO-LOCKEAN THEORY OF SUBSTANCES AND PERSONS

John Foster, in The Immaterial Self, provides a Phenomenal version of the Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity on which basic mental subjects and persons differ in their identity-conditions. Foster distinguishes the concepts of mental subject and basic subject. Something is a mental subject if and only
if it has mental states or performs mental acts. Something is a basic subject if and only if the philosophically fundamental account represents it as such. Such an account is the conceptually fundamental account of the metaphysically fundamental reality. The conceptually fundamental account is one that is conceptually irreducible. The metaphysically fundamental reality is one that is metaphysically irreducible. Set aside the idea of conceptual reduction, which we will not use. Focus instead on the idea of metaphysical reduction. Foster explains: “a fact $F$ is wholly constituted by a fact or set of facts $F'$ if and only if two conditions hold:

1. $F$ obtains in virtue of $F'$
2. The obtaining of $F$ is nothing over and above the obtaining of $F'$.”

If, for example, John weighs 150 lbs. and Mary weighs 130 lbs., the fact that John is heavier than Mary is wholly constituted by these facts about weight. Each of the two conditions implies $F'$ entails $F$. But this isn’t enough. Constitution implies dependence, which entailment by itself doesn’t. Each fact entails itself, but no fact depends on itself. So, the first condition implies, in addition, that $F$ depends on $F'$. Foster writes, “we want constitution to be such that, where $F$ is constituted by $F'$, $F$ derives its obtaining from (owes its obtaining to) the obtaining of $F'$, in a way which precludes the same relationship holding in reverse. It is this element of asymmetric dependence which, in addition to mere logical necessitation, is expressed by saying (in condition (1)) that $F$ obtains in virtue of $F'$” (Foster 1991, 140). But this isn’t enough either. Constitution also implies absorption or inclusion, which entailment and dependence by themselves don’t. Facts about effects are entailed by and depend on facts about causes and laws but facts about effects are separate from and additional to facts about causes and laws. So, the second condition implies, in addition, that $F$ is neither separate from nor additional to $F'$. Foster writes, “we want the constitution-relation to exclude this kind of separateness, so that where $F$ is constituted by $F'$, the obtaining of $F$ is wholly absorbed by, and included in, the obtaining of $F'$. It is this absorption, or inclusion, which is expressed by saying (in condition (2)) that the obtaining of $F$ is nothing over and above the obtaining of $F'$” (ibid., 141).

Here is some terminology. Mental states are co-personal if and only if they belong to the same person. Mental states are co-subjective if and only if

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5 Foster’s “wholly constituted by” is a version of “is grounded in”, see Balcarras (2017).
they belong to the same basic subject. The Phenomenal Neo-Lockean starts from the concept of direct co-consciousness:

\[(C1) \text{Experiences are directly co-conscious if and only if they are parts of the same experience.}\]

And the Phenomenal Neo-Lockean starts with the claim that simultaneous experiences are co-personal if and only if they are directly co-conscious. For example, if I have a visual experience at some time and an aural experience then, I have a visual-aural experience then, where the former are parts of the latter. What we need now, though, is a unitary account of co-personality that extends the relation of direct co-consciousness to experiences at different times. Note two things. First, note that since experiences extend over time, some experiences have other experiences as parts, which occur at different times. Suppose I hear a C major scale. I have an aural experience. I successively hear the notes C and D. I have an experience of C and then an experience of D, which are parts of the same experience, but occur at different times. So, some experiences at different times are directly co-conscious. Secondly, note that some experiences that occur at different times, though not directly co-conscious, have experiential parts in common. Suppose I hear the notes C and D, and hear the notes D and E, but the first and second experiences are not parts of the same experience. Still, I have an experience of D, which is a common part of the former two. So, some experiences that occur at different times, though not directly co-conscious, are indirectly co-conscious:

\[(C2) \text{Experiences are indirectly co-conscious if and only if they stand in the ancestral of direct co-consciousness.}\]

Now assume a person persists for some interval without any experience: some period, for example, of dreamless sleep. What connects the two series of indirectly co-conscious experiences of the same person: the series before she sleeps and the series after she wakes? What we need now is a further unitary account of co-personality that extends the relation of indirect co-consciousness to connect such series.

Foster proposes potential co-consciousness. A total experience is any experience that is not a proper part of any experience. A stream of experience is any series of overlapping total experiences. And a total stream of exper-
ence is any stream of experience that is not a proper part of any stream of experience. Suppose there are two total streams of experience A and B, that A occurs before B does, and that there’s a temporal gap between A and B. Then A and B are directly joinable if and only if something ensures that if A had existed, and if B had existed, and if A had continued to the time when B began, the continuation would have joined up to B:

(C3) Any two total streams are directly joinable if and only if something ensures that if both had existed and if one had continued to the time when the other began, the continuation would have joined up to the other.

(C4) Any two total streams are indirectly joinable if and only if they stand in the ancestral of direct joinability.

(C5) Experiences are potentially co-conscious if and only if the total streams in which they occur are directly or indirectly joinable.

So, experiences are co-consciousness-related (C-related) if and only if they are directly, indirectly, or potentially co-conscious. And experiences are co-personal if and only if they are C-related. Ultimately, Foster rejects this theory of personal identity. He argues, on its basis, that all and only C-related experiences are co-subjective. He argues first that all C-related experiences are co-subjective, and second that all co-subjective experiences are C-related.

I shall resist his argument for both claims. The argument for the first claim has four steps:

(A1) Directly co-conscious experiences are co-subjective.

(A2) Indirectly co-conscious experiences are co-subjective.

(A3) Experiences in directly joinable total streams are co-subjective.

(A4) Experiences in indirectly joinable total streams are co-subjective.

Consider just the first step. If that step fails, the whole argument does. So, suppose two experiences M1 and M2 are directly co-conscious. Then M1 and M2 are parts of the same experience M3. Every experience, so Foster contends, belongs to some basic subject. So, M3 belongs to some basic subject S3. Moreover, if some experience belongs to some subject, then every part of that experience that is also an experience belongs to that subject. So, M1 and M2 belong to S3 and so are co-subjective.

But why think the ownership principle that every experience belongs to some basic subject is true? Every experience, of course, belongs to some
subject. I even concede that, for some partition of a complex experience, every part of the complex that is also an experience belongs to some basic subject. But I see no reason to think the ownership principle is true. Suppose I successively hear the notes C and D but one basic subject has only the experience of C and another basic subject has only the experience of D. Then, though the complex experience of both C and D belongs to some subject (i.e., me) and, though, for some partition, every part of the complex belongs to some basic subject, the complex itself does not belong to any basic subject.

I also resist Foster’s argument for the claim that all co-subjective experiences are C-related. The argument begins with the following principle:

(P) Simultaneous co-subjective experiences are directly co-conscious.

Suppose two co-subjective experiences M₁ and M₂ occur in two total streams A and B respectively. M₁ and M₂ are simultaneous or they aren’t. If they are, then by (P), they are directly co-conscious and so C-related. If M₁ and M₂ aren’t simultaneous, they are directly co-conscious or not. If they are directly co-conscious, they are C-related. If M₁ and M₂ are neither simultaneous nor directly co-conscious, they are indirectly co-conscious or not. If they are indirectly co-conscious, they are C-related. Suppose M₁ and M₂ are neither simultaneous, nor are they directly co-conscious, nor are they indirectly co-conscious. And suppose A is before B and there’s a temporal interval between A and B. Then there’s a possible world W where A exists, B exists, and A continues to when B begins. Suppose, in W, there are two experiences M₃ and M₄, where M₃ is the last experience of the continuation of A, M₄ is the first experience of B, and M₃ and M₄ are simultaneous. Assume for the sake of argument that all C-related experiences are co-subjective. So, in W, M₁ and M₃, which are C-related, are co-subjective. And, in W, M₂ and M₄, which are C-related, are co-subjective. M₁ and M₂ are actually co-subjective. But any experience that belongs to a basic subject essentially belongs to that basic subject. So, in W, M₁ and M₂ are co-subjective. The relation of co-subjectivity is symmetric and transitive. By symmetry, since M₁ and M₃ are co-subjective, M₃ and M₁ are co-subjective. By transitivity, since M₃ and M₁ are co-subjective, and since M₁ and M₂ are co-subjective, M₃ and M₂ are co-subjective. And, by transitivity, since M₃ and M₂ are co-subjective, and since M₂ and M₄ are co-subjective, M₃ and M₄ are co-subjective. So, in W, M₃ and M₄ are co-subjective. So, by (P), in W, M₃ and M₄ are directly co-conscious. So, A and B are directly joinable. So, M₁
and M2 are potentially co-conscious and so C-related. So, by (P), all co-subjective experiences are C-related.

But why believe that simultaneous co-subjective experiences are directly co-conscious (i.e., (P))? Foster, in fact, qualifies (P) to allow for the possibility of branching streams of experience. If, however, we accept that there could be simultaneous co-subjective experiences that aren’t directly co-conscious, then it seems we should also accept that there could be simultaneous co-subjective experiences that aren’t in any way C-related. If we can imagine a branching stream, it seems we can also imagine parallel streams that don’t result from an earlier fission or result in a later fusion. So, even if there’s good reason to think that all C-related experiences are co-subjective, which I don’t admit, there’s no good reason to think that all co-subjective experiences are C-related.

Finally, on any Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity, not just the Phenomenal version, persons, though mental subjects, are not basic subjects: they are not fundamental. If organisms are the same if and only if they have the same life, then organisms exist because lives occur, which occur because particles jointly act as they do. So, if organism-identity consists in sameness of life, then facts about particles wholly constitute facts about organisms, and so organisms are not fundamental. Likewise, if persons are the same if and only if they have the same consciousness, then persons exist because consciousnesses occur, which occur because spirits (or particles or both together) act as they do. So, if person-identity consists in sameness of consciousness, then facts about spirits (or particles or both together) wholly constitute facts about persons, and so persons are not fundamental. In general, on any Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity, persons have psychological identity-conditions and so persons exist because certain mental states exist, which exist because other beings act as they do. So, on any Neo-Lockean theory, facts about other beings wholly constitute facts about persons, and so again persons are not fundamental.

A NEO-LOCKEAN THEORY OF THE TRINITY AND INCARNATION

The Neo-Lockean theory of the Trinity and Incarnation says the following:

(1) God constitutes each divine person.
(2) Some divine experiences are co-subjective but not co-personal.
(3) When the Son is incarnate, God and the Son’s human nature each partly and both together wholly constitute the Son’s mental life.

(4) When the Son is incarnate, some divine experience and some human experience are co-personal but not co-subjective.

(5) God and the Son’s human nature are fundamental, but no divine person is fundamental.

What do we mean by the words “person”, “nature”, “constitutes”, and “fundamental”? Each person is a rational being with intellect and will. In the ordinary inclusive sense of the word “person”, a person is a someone: anything that can literally refer to itself using a first-person singular pronoun, i.e., anything that can be the object of an I-thought. In this sense, each of the Father, Son, and Spirit is a person. The Father can refer to himself using the pronoun “I”. As St Matthew the evangelist writes, “And a voice from heaven said, ‘This is my Son, the Beloved, with whom I am well pleased’” (Mt. 3:17 NRSV). So, the Father is a person. Each of the Son and Spirit has the same nature as the Father. So, each of them is also a person. They are distinct from each other. So, they are three persons.

There are two senses of the word “nature”: abstract and concrete. Each abstract nature is a feature, by having which something is of the kind it is. So, the abstract divine nature is the feature of being divine. And the abstract human nature is the feature of being human. Similarly, each concrete nature is a concrete being (i.e., a being with causal powers), in virtue of having which something is of the kind it is. So, the concrete divine nature is a concrete being, in virtue of having which a person is divine. And each concrete human nature is a concrete being, in virtue of having which a person is human (cf. PAWL 2019, 24–25). Each divine person has the same concrete divine nature, by having which each is divine. And the Son has not only the concrete divine nature, but also a distinct concrete human nature, by having which the Son is human. I identify the concrete divine nature with God, and, for simplicity’s sake, I identify the concrete human nature the Son assumes with a humanly embodied finite spirit. A spirit is any immaterial basic mental subject. It is humanly embodied just if it is related in the way each of us is to a human organism. One might, instead, identify the concrete human nature with a hylomorphic compound of a human body and soul, or a human organism, or whatever it turns out that a human being is. If any of these were

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not fundamental, though, to so identify would require I distinguish absolute from relative fundamentality, which would complicate the exposition. That must suffice for “person” and “nature”. What of “constitutes” and “fundamental”?

Here are some definitions:

(D1) Among beings, A constitutes B if and only if the fact that B exists is wholly constituted by some fact about A (cf. Foster 1982, 6).

(D2) Among beings, A partly constitutes C if and only if there’s a third being B such that the fact that C exists is wholly constituted by some fact about A, some fact about B, and some fact about how A and B are related, but the fact that C exists is not wholly constituted by any fact about A or any fact about B on its own (cf. ibid.)

(D3) Among beings, A constitutes B’s mental life if and only if the totality of facts about B’s mental life is wholly constituted by some fact about A.

(D4) Among beings, A partly constitutes C’s mental life if and only if there’s a third being B such that the totality of facts about C’s mental life is wholly constituted by some fact about A, some fact about B, and some fact about how A and B are related, but the totality of facts about C’s mental life is not wholly constituted by any fact about A or any fact about B on its own.

(D5) A being is fundamental if and only if no being constitutes it (cf. ibid., 7).

So, what does the Neo-Lockean theory say? First, the theory says that God constitutes each divine person. God has three (parallel) total streams of experience. The fact that the Father exists is wholly constituted by the fact that God has the first total stream. And the same goes for the Son and Spirit. Having said this, I now qualify. When the Son is not incarnate, God’s second stream is total. When the Son is incarnate, God’s second stream is not total, being part of a larger stream that includes the assumed human spirit’s stream. That is, God’s second stream and the human spirit’s stream compose the Son’s total stream. Regardless, God constitutes the Son. The fact that the Son exists is wholly constituted by the fact that God has the second stream, be it total or not. And, since the Son’s existence obtains in virtue of, and so is explained by, some fact about God, this pre-empts the Son’s existence.
from later also obtaining in virtue of some fact about the human spirit. So, the human spirit neither constitutes nor even partly constitutes the Son.

Secondly, the Neo-Lockean theory says that some divine experiences are co-subjective but not co-personal. God has three (parallel) streams. The experiences that occur in the first stream are C-related to each other. And the experiences that occur in the second stream are C-related to each other. No experience, however, that occurs in the first stream is C-related to any experience that occurs in the second stream. Experiences that occur in different streams are neither directly nor indirectly co-conscious. And the streams are neither directly nor indirectly joinable. The streams must always be parallel. And the streams can never begin or end. So, nothing ensures that if one continued to when the other began, the continuation would join up to the other. So, experiences that occur in different streams are not potentially co-conscious. So, on this theory, some experiences are co-subjective but not C-related and so not co-personal.

Thirdly, the Neo-Lockean theory says that, when the Son is incarnate, God and the assumed human spirit each partly and both together wholly constitute the Son’s mental life. The totality of facts about the Son’s mental life is wholly constituted by the fact that God has the second stream, the fact that the human spirit has its stream, and some fact about how God and the human spirit are related. But that totality of facts is not wholly constituted by any fact about God or any fact about the human spirit on its own. Moreover, the totality of facts about the Son’s divine mental life is wholly constituted by the fact that God has the second stream. And God qualifies as the Son’s divine nature (at least partly) because God, who is divine, constitutes the Son’s existence and divine mental life, which makes the Son divine. Furthermore, the totality of facts about the Son’s human mental life is wholly constituted by the fact that the human spirit has its stream. And the assumed humanly embodied spirit qualifies as the Son’s human nature (at least partly) because this human spirit, which is human, though it doesn’t constitute the Son’s existence, does constitute the Son’s human mental life, which makes the Son human.

Fourthly, the Neo-Lockean theory says that, when the Son is incarnate, some divine experience and some human experience are co-personal but not co-subjective. When incarnate, God’s second stream and the human spirit’s stream compose the Son’s total stream. So, God’s experiences and the human spirit’s experiences do not overlap and so are not co-subjective. The Son’s experiences, however, are either directly or indirectly co-conscious
with each other and so are C-related and so co-personal. So, on this theory, some experiences are C-related and so co-personal but not co-subjective. Moreover, when incarnate, some divine experience and some human experience occur in the same stream and so are directly or indirectly co-conscious. If some are indirectly co-conscious, then some are directly co-conscious. How could this be? Perhaps God, in each stream, always introspects every other divine experience that occurs in that stream. So, for any divine experience that occurs in the first stream, there’s an introspective act that also occurs in the first stream. And perhaps, when incarnate, God, in the second stream, introspects every human experience the human spirit has. If, though, a mental subject introspects an experience, the introspective act and the experience, which is an object of that act, are directly co-conscious. So, there’s a divine introspective act that occurs in God’s second stream and a human experience that occurs in the human spirit’s stream, which are directly co-conscious. And so, they compose a complex divine-human experience, which only the Son has. But if God and the human spirit together wholly constitute the Son’s mental life, how could the Son have a complex experience that neither of them has? The fact that the Son has this divine-human experience is wholly constituted by the fact that God has the divine introspective act, the fact that the human spirit has the human experience, and some fact about how God and the human spirit are related. How are they related? Perhaps, they are related by introspection itself. God introspectively represents, in the first-person way, as had by the Son, what the human spirit experiences. Perhaps, but, of course, I don’t know. The theory does not depend on this speculative proposal. In any case, I see no reason why God and the human spirit could not be related so that only the Son has such a complex divine-human experience.

Fifthly, the Neo-Lockean theory says that God and the Son’s human spirit are fundamental, but no divine person is fundamental. Both God and any human spirit are spirits. Plausibly, though, every spirit is an immaterial basic mental subject and so not constituted. In addition, the concept of God is that of a perfect being and so independent and so not constituted. So, no being constitutes God or the Son’s human spirit. And so, God and the Son’s human spirit are fundamental. God, though, constitutes each divine person. So, each divine person is not fundamental. So, on the Neo-Lockean theory, strictly speaking, no divine person is God. There’s a natural sense, though, in which each divine person is a God. On some versions of physicalism, though no mental fact is identical to any physical fact, each mental fact is wholly con-
stituted by some physical fact. So, though, strictly speaking, no mental fact is a physical fact, there’s a natural sense of “is” in which each mental fact is a physical fact. One could truly say, the fact that perceptual experiences occur just is the fact that certain neural events occur, meaning they are wholly constituted by them. On some versions of idealism, though no physical fact is identical to any mental fact, each physical fact is wholly constituted by some mental fact. So, though, strictly speaking, no physical fact is a mental fact, there’s a natural sense of “is” in which each physical fact is a mental fact. Again, one could truly say, the fact that physical objects exist just is the fact that certain dispositions for sense-experience exist, again meaning they are wholly constituted by them. If there are such constitution-relations between facts of different types, there’s a sense of “is” in which a constituted fact of one type just is a more basic fact of another type. Likewise, on this version of the Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity, though no person is identical to any spirit, every person is constituted by some spirit. So, though, strictly speaking, no person is a spirit, there’s a natural sense in which each person just is a spirit.

So, on the Neo-Lockean theory, since God constitutes each divine person, there’s a natural sense in which each divine person is a God. And so, on the Neo-Lockean theory, there’s (only) one God, there are three divine persons, and, though, once again, strictly speaking, no divine person is a God, there’s a natural sense in which each divine person is a God. This solves the logical problem of the Trinity. Finally, the Son’s human nature lacks personal identity-conditions and so is not a person. Is, though, the human nature intrinsically just like a complete human person? It depends whether personal identity-conditions are intrinsic. If they are, the Son’s human nature is not intrinsically just like a complete human person, in which case (5) above, which says that the human nature the Son assumes is intrinsically just like a complete human person, is false. If they are not intrinsic, however, and if the Son’s human nature is intrinsically just like a complete human person, then (6) above, which says anything intrinsically just like a complete human person is a person, is false. So, on the Neo-Lockean theory, (5) or (6) above is false. Either way, this solves the metaphysical problem of Incarnation.
I present two problems: the logical problem of the Trinity and the metaphysical problem of Incarnation. I propose a solution to both problems: a Neo-Lockean theory of the Trinity and Incarnation, which applies a Neo-Lockean theory of personal identity to the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation.

**Keywords:** John Locke; John Foster; Trinity; Incarnation; Christology; person; nature; constitution.
A NEO-LOCKEAN THEORY OF THE TRINITY AND INCARNATION

NEOLOCKE’OWSKA TEORIA TRÓJCY ŚWIĘTEJ I WCIELENIA

Streszczenie

W artykule autor omawia dwie kwestie: logiczne problemy dotyczące Trójcy Świętej i metafizyczny problem Wcielenia. Autor proponuje rozwiązanie obu tych problemów – neolocke’owską teorię Trójcy Świętej i Wcielenia, która stosuje neolocke’owską teorię tożsamości osoby do doktryn o Trójcy Świętej i Wcieleniu.

Słowa kluczowe: John Locke; John Foster; Trójca Święta; Wcielenie; chrystologia; osoba; natura; konstytucja.