There are many different formulations of anti-naturalistic arguments from reason. Prominent examples include: BALFOUR (1879), HALDANE (1929), JOAD (1933), LEWIS (1947), TAYLOR (1963), MORELAND (1987), PLANTINGA (1991), REPPERT (1999), and HASKER (2013a). Some of these formulations are more fully developed than others. I shall briefly discuss all of them here. In what remains of the paper, I shall turn my attention to other issues that arise in connection with the discussion of HASKER (2013a). An important part of this discussion is consideration of the ways in which Hasker’s argument is significantly different from the family of arguments that PLANTINGA (1991, 1992, 1993, 1999, 2004, 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2014) presents.

It is said in some places that Chesterton (1908, 1933) also hints at anti-naturalistic arguments from reason. However, on my reading of those texts, Chesterton’s claims are primarily directed at certain kinds of vapid scepticism (e.g., solipsism). I could find nothing in these texts that suggested an argument for the conclusion that evolutionary naturalism is somehow self-defeating. Consequently, I have included no discussion of Chesterton in what follows.

1. BALFOUR

Balfour (1879, 266), under the heading “Naturalism and Reason”, provides an entire section (Part III, Chapter XIII) devoted to showing that evolutionary naturalism is self-defeating. The following extract gives the gist:
Our position (as evolutionists) is this: From certain ultimate beliefs we infer that an order of things exists by which all beliefs, and therefore all ultimate beliefs, are produced, but according to which any particular belief, and therefore any particular ultimate belief, must be doubtful. Now, this is a position which is self-destructive…. Our whole ground for finding these ultimate premises doubtful is founded in the last resort upon their certainty. This is a manifest flaw or defect, which must be fatal to the validity of any system from which it cannot be removed.

Suppose that we have a “system of beliefs”. Suppose that we can axiomatise that “system of beliefs”. Given that we can axiomatise the “system of beliefs”, it will be true that all other beliefs in the “system of beliefs” are logical consequences of the axioms. Is there any reason to suppose that the axioms of our “system of belief” are certain? On the contrary! If our axioms are all certain, then all of the beliefs in our “system of belief” are certain. But that is an absurd result. If we can axiomatise our “system of beliefs”, the axioms of our “system of belief” are not all certainties.

Suppose we are evolutionary naturalists. Suppose, in particular, that we believe that there is an evolutionary order—the natural causal order—within which all believing occurs. Suppose, in addition, that we have further beliefs of which this particular belief is a logical consequence. What reason is there to suppose that we take the particular belief, or any of the further beliefs, to be certain? It is hard to see any such reason. Moreover, it is easy to see why it makes sense for us to suppose that none of these beliefs is certain. After all, apart from anything else, we are well aware of the controversial nature of all of these beliefs. It is sufficient, to meet the requisites for belief, that we take the claim, that there is an evolutionary order within which all believing occurs, to be more plausible than any of its competitors, and sufficiently plausible that our attitude towards it counts as belief. Nothing speaks in favour of taking any of the beliefs in question to be certain.

It is worth noting that nothing in the argument here requires that we are not very close to certain that there is an evolutionary order within which all believing occurs. It is also worth noting that it is compatible with the argument given here that we are practically certain that there is an evolutionary order within which all believing occurs. If we are prepared to speak in terms of credences: we can give credence 1-ε to the claim, there is an evolutionary order within which all believing occurs, where ε is only theoretically distinguishable from zero.

The text of Balfour (1879) that we have discussed is essentially a reproduction of the text of Balfour (1877). There are similar, related discus-
sions, in several other of Balfour’s works, such as BALFOUR (1895). For more on Balfour and his thought, one might consult ROOT (1980) and TALIAFERRO (2015).

2. HALDANE

Haldane (1929, 209) writes as follows:

If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true … and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.

While I do not think that it was Haldane’s intention to be so interpreted, this passage might be taken to be an argument against evolutionary naturalism. There are various ways in which naturalists might respond to the argument, so understood. Since I am an identity theorist, I will give a response that might appeal to other identity theorists. I leave it to naturalists who are not identity theorists to develop their own responses.

It is simply inaccurate to say that mental processes are “…determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain.” At least roughly, mental states and processes are neural states and processes: states of, and processes in, networks of neurons. While “motions of atoms” have some role to play in the constitution of the states and processes in question, it is simply not true that those states and processes are “determined wholly” by those “motions of atoms”.

More carefully—and more accurately—mental states and processes are neural states and processes that have been appropriately shaped by local, social and evolutionary history and that are appropriately causally related to those environments. While “motions of atoms” have some role to play, not only in the constitution of the states and processes, but also in the constitution of the local, social, and evolutionary history, and in the constitution of the causal relation of the states and processes to the current environment, it is simply not true that all of this is “determined wholly” by the “motions of atoms”.

Grant that objects in the universe exist at different scales (or, equivalently, energy levels). There are different kinds of causal interactions that occur within these different scales and across these different scales. But there is no
reduction of these different kinds of causal interactions to a single scale, and there is no emergence of these different kinds of causal interactions from a single scale. Objects that exist at higher scales (or lower energy levels) are constituted, without remainder, by objects that exist at lower scales (or higher energy levels). But it simply does not follow, from this fact about the constitution of objects, that there is determination of events (states, processes) at higher scales by events (states, processes) at lower scales.

That I suppose that my brain is constituted by cells (molecules, atoms, etc.), and that I suppose further that my mental states and processes are neural states and processes that have been appropriately shaped by local, social and evolutionary history and that are appropriately causally related to those environments, is no barrier at all to my further supposing that some of my beliefs and beliefings are true. Or, at any rate, there is nothing in the argument that we are attributing to Haldane that says otherwise.

3. JOAD

Joad (1933, 99) says that, if the conclusions of behaviourist psychology are correct, there is no reason to think them true. It is not plausible that, when Joad wrote these words, he intended to make an argument against evolutionary naturalism. Perhaps, when he reconverted to Christianity late in life, he might have been moved to see things differently. But it is clear that, at the time, his intention was merely to argue that behaviourist psychology is self-defeating in something like the kind of way that Balfour took evolutionary naturalism to be self-defeating.

Whether we are moved to suppose that behaviourist psychology is self-defeating in the way that Joad supposes that it is may depend upon what we take behaviourist psychology to be. If we think that behaviourist psychology is primarily a movement that insists that scientific psychological theorising should be based upon replicable publicly observable observations and experiments, then it is not clear why we could not have reason to think that conclusions drawn by behaviourist psychologists are true. Perhaps we might think that, if the evidence base for scientific psychological theorising is restricted to replicable publicly observable observations and experiments, there will be important truths about our psychology that remain inaccessible to behaviourist psychology. But that is not enough to undermine the claim
that we could have reasons to think that conclusions drawn by behaviourist psychologists are true.

In his discussion of behaviourism, Ryle (1949, 300–303) draws a distinction between the methodology of behaviourist psychology and the—in his view, deplorable—mechanist or para-mechanist tendencies of early behaviourists. If we take this distinction seriously, then it is more plausible to assimilate Joad’s argument to the argument from Haldane that we discussed in the previous section. For it is plausible to think that it is really the mechanist or para-mechanist tendencies of early behaviourists that is the pivot on which the argument turns, rather than the insistence that scientific psychological theorising should be based upon replicable publicly observable observations and experiments.

For more about Joad and his thought, one might consult, for example, THOMAS (1992), HECK (2009) and JUDGE (2012).

4. LEWIS

Lewis (1947, 28) devotes a chapter to arguing that naturalism is self-defeating. The following extract gives the gist:

The mind, like every other particular thing or event, is supposed to be simply the product of the Total System.… It is supposed to be that and nothing more, to have no power whatever of “going on of its own accord”…. And the Total System is not supposed to be rational…. All thoughts are therefore the results of irrational causes and nothing more than that.

Suppose we interpret “the Total System” to be natural causal reality. Then, by the lights of evolutionary naturalists like me, the following two things are true: (a) every particular thing or event is located within natural causal reality; and (b) every particular non-initial thing has a cause of its coming into existence, every particular non-initial event has a cause of its occurring, and so on. Whether we should suppose that every particular thing or event is simply a product of what came before depends upon whether we suppose that causation is deterministic or indeterministic. (Lewis expresses scepticism about indeterministic causation. But he offers nothing that anyone could count as an argument against it.) Whether we should suppose that anything “has the power of going on of its own accord” depends on exactly how we interpret this expression. If we suppose—as I suggested in my
discussion of Haldane—that there is no determination of events (states, processes) at higher scales by events (states, processes) at lower scales, then it seems that we are free to say that, in a perfectly good sense, there are many kinds of things that have the power to go on of their own accord. While we can argue about exactly where the cut-off for organisms lies, I think that this kind of power goes pretty deep into the animal kingdom. Given that this power rests, at least in part, in central neural processing in organisms, and given that there is a certain amount of rationality in this processing even in lower parts of the animal kingdom, there is simply no good argument here to the conclusion that everything in natural reality is the product of irrational causes. Moreover, and in particular, there is no good argument here to the conclusion that all thoughts are the products of irrational causes.

There are further things to say about Lewis’ argument. Some of the relevant things were said by Anscombe (1948), in an exchange that, on the evidence of his own letters, left Lewis quite downhearted. One obvious point is that, if we agree to say that any cause that is not rational is irrational, then all that Lewis conclusion claims is that thoughts have causes not all of which are rational. But that is obviously true. The tree in my backyard is, on occasion, a cause of my thinking that there is a tree in my backyard. But, obviously enough, the tree in my backyard is not rational. Perhaps it might be claimed that we have some thoughts all of whose causes are rational. But, at least if we allow that causation is transitive, that is surely false. It is perhaps worth noting that, even if we amend Lewis’ argument so that it is framed in terms of non-rational causes, rather than in terms of irrational causes, these objections to the argument continue to stand. (This just mentioned amendment is made by Lewis in the revised edition that appeared in 1960.)

5. Taylor

Taylor (1963, xii) says that he got his argument from James Kiefer. He adds that, though he had not been able to verify this, he believes that Kiefer’s argument comes from Lewis (1947). If there is a connection between the argument that Taylor sets out, and the argument of Lewis (1947), it is quite indirect. Here is an extract from Taylor (1963, 96–101) that gives the gist:
It would be irrational for you to regard an arrangement of stones [spelling out the words “the British Railways welcomes you to Wales”] as evidence that you are entering Wales and at the same time to suppose that the stone might have come to that arrangement accidentally…. It would be [similarly] irrational for one to say both that his sensory and cognitive faculties had a natural, non-purposeful origin and also that they reveal some truth, with respect to something other than themselves, something that is not merely inferred from them…. If we assume that [our sense organs] are guides to some truth have nothing to do with themselves, it is difficult to see how we can believe them to have arisen by the ordinary workings of purposeless forces even over aeons of time.

There are irrelevant objections to the first claim. It could be said, for example, that it is not entirely out of the question that the decision about where to put the border between England and Wales was guided, in part, by the natural formation of stones. What is really out of the question is that you suppose that there is no explanatory connection between the message spelled out by the stones and the location of the border between England and Wales and yet you also take the message spelled out by the stones to tell you that you are at that border.

Set irrelevant objections aside. What is really puzzling is why anyone would suppose that there is even a relevant similarity between what it would be irrational to say (in the first case) and what it plainly would not be irrational to say (in the second case). In the first case, we are considering whether one thing is evidence for a second if we further suppose that it entirely accidental that the former appears to have any evidential bearing on the latter. In the second case, we are considering whether one thing is a conduit of information from a second if we further suppose that there is no purposive agent who arranges for the reliability of the conduit of information. The obvious point to make is that friends of evolutionary naturalism have a perfectly good story to tell about how our senses get to be reliable conduits of information about our environment even though there is no purposive agent who arranges for their reliability. There is not even the slightest hint of a consideration here that should cause evolutionary naturalists to lose sleep.

6. MORELAND

Moreland (1987, 49–50) claims that, if we did not suppose that our senses and cognitive faculties are products of intelligent design, we would have no
reason to suppose that they reliably inform us about the world in which we live. Anticipating the response that some will say that it would be sufficient to suppose that natural selection has ensured that our senses and cognitive faculties do reliably inform us about many aspects of the world in which we live, Moreland objects that it is not at all obvious that being able to gain accurate information about the world is necessary for survival. In his view, as long as an organism interacts consistently with its environment, it need not rely on gaining accurate information about that environment. Somewhat fancifully, he provides two examples to illustrate this line of thought: it would not matter to survival if blue things were perceived to be red, and vice versa; and it would not matter to survival if large things were perceived to be small, and vice versa.

Perhaps the most obvious point to make in reply is that, even if Moreland were right that gaining accurate information about the environment is not necessary to individual survival, it is blindingly obvious that improvements in gaining accurate information about the environment will be one of the products of the evolutionary arms race. If—perhaps per impossible—your kind is disposed to perceive large things as small and small things as large whereas my kind is disposed to accurately perceive the relative sizes of things, and all else is equal, then there are all kinds of ways in which your kind will be relatively hampered in its pursuit of the four Fs. Your kind will make systematic errors—about which things to fight, which things to flee, which things to feed upon, and which things with which to try to reproduce—that my kind will not make. All else being equal, your kind is ahead of mine in line for the exit door.

As I have noted in earlier parts of this discussion, evolutionary naturalists have the best of reasons for supposing that, across a wide range of domains, our senses and cognitive faculties do reliably inform us about the world in which we live. Of course, even in the best cases, there are limits: for example, our vision is not so good if it is smoky, or foggy, or we have consumed too much alcohol, etc. And there are many domains where it is obvious that our senses and cognitive faculties do not reliably inform us about the world in which we live: philosophy, politics and religion are three examples that immediately spring to mind. But it is unsurprising that, for example, much of the time, evolved vision provides a great many of us with reliable information about stationary and slow-moving medium-size things in our immediate environments.
7. PLANTINGA


Here, I shall just briefly discuss one of the arguments from reason presented in PLANTINGA (2011a). I have previously discussed this argument in OPPY (2018). Suppose that we make the following definitions:

R: The cognitive faculties that produce our metaphysical beliefs are reliable—i.e. they reliably produce true metaphysical beliefs.
N: Naturalism is true.
E: We and our cognitive faculties have come to be in the way proposed by contemporary evolutionary theory.

Plantinga’s argument then runs as follows:

1. Pr (R/N&E) is low. (Premise)
2. Anyone who accepts N&E and sees that Pr (R/N&E) is low has a defeater for R. (Premise)
3. Anyone who has a defeater for R has a defeater for any other metaphysical belief she thinks she has, including N&E itself. (Premise)
4. If one who accepts N&E thereby acquires a defeater for N&E, then N&E is self-defeating and cannot be rationally accepted. (Premise)
5. (Therefore) N&E cannot be rationally accepted. (From 1–4)
One way that one might be tempted to respond to this argument is to point out that it is obviously false that the cognitive faculties that produce our metaphysical beliefs reliably produce true metaphysical beliefs: the probability that our cognitive faculties that produce our metaphysical beliefs are reliable in this way is near enough zero. Why? Because there is next to nothing in metaphysics on which there is even bare majority agreement among metaphysicians. That near universal disagreement is almost impossible to explain if the cognitive faculties that produce our metaphysical beliefs reliably produce true metaphysical beliefs. So it must be that the probability of R conditional on any acceptable view is low. So, if theism is an acceptable view, then the probability of R on theism is also low. There is no problem here for evolutionary naturalism that is not equally a problem for theism.

But is there a problem for any metaphysician here? I do not think so. Even if I suppose that I am not going to reliably form true metaphysical beliefs, it is hard to see that there is any objection here to my forming metaphysical beliefs to each of which I give credence that is at least somewhat greater than 0.5 (and to some of which I give a credence that is very much greater than 0.5). It is not hard to see that you can give middling credence to a large number of beliefs, while also giving low credence to the claim that many more than half of those beliefs are true. I can think that I am not reliable while, at the same time, continuing to form beliefs, so long as I do not give absurdly high credence to all of the beliefs that I form. At most, what we have here, it seems to me, is an argument for sensible fallibilism about the bulk of one’s metaphysical speculations. Moreover, there is nothing here that tells against your supposing that, in particular cases, you have very good reason to give high credence to particular metaphysical beliefs, such as the belief that naturalism is true.

8. REPPERT

Following REPPERT (2003), we might suggest that the text of LEWIS (1947) ultimately inspires this argument:

1. No belief is rationally inferred if it can be fully explained in terms of non-rational causes. (Premise)
2. If naturalism is true, then all beliefs can be fully explained in terms of non-rational causes. (Premise)
3. We have good reason to accept naturalism only if it can be rationally inferred from good evidence. (Premise)

4. (Therefore) There is not, and cannot be, good reason to accept naturalism. (From 1–3)

I think that the first premise in this argument is true. If a belief has none but non-rational causes, then it cannot be that the belief is explained in terms of its rational inference from other beliefs.

I think that the second premise of this argument is plainly false. As previously, I shall give an explanation that I think might win the approval of at least some other identity theorists. Given that beliefs are just certain kinds of neural states, it follows that rational beliefs are just certain kinds of neural states. Given that formations of beliefs are just certain kinds of neural processing, it follows that rational formations of beliefs are just certain kinds of neural processing. If a given belief is fully explained in terms of prior neural states and neural processing—and, in particular, if a given belief is fully explained in terms of prior rational beliefs and prior rational inference—and if the belief is fully explained in terms of non-rational causes, then it must be that those prior rational beliefs and prior rational inference are non-rational. But that is absurd. At least by the lights of identity theorists, if naturalism is true, then it is not the case that all beliefs can be fully explained in terms of non-rational causes.

Although discussion of the third premise is now something of a fifth wheel to the coach, it is perhaps worth pointing out that it is not obvious that the third premise is correct. It depends on what is required in order to there be rational inference from good evidence. If global theory choice on total evidence is a species of rational inference from good evidence, then I will accept the third premise. Else, not. There is no requirement that naturalists must suppose that there is a particular smoking gun that, all on its own, decides in favour of their view.

Hasker (2013a) defends an anti-naturalistic argument from reason that differs in important ways from all of the arguments discussed above. I provide a lengthy extract that gives the core of Hasker’s view, starting with a formal argument that he presents:

1. Human beings are capable of achieving conscious knowledge and awareness of many aspects of the world through their interactions with the world and their reflections upon it. (Premise)
2. The fact stated in 1 has—and must have—an adequate explanation. (Premise)
3. If naturalism is true, there can be no explanation of the fact stated in 1. (Premise)
4. (Therefore) Naturalism is false.

The only naturalistic explanation for (1) that has been seriously proposed is found in evolutionary psychology.... On naturalistic assumptions, evolutionary psychology contributes nothing whatever to the explanation of the fact affirmed by (1).... Evolutionary epistemology cannot explain the truth of (1) because, on naturalistic assumptions, mental events have no causal consequences and are thus invisible to evolutionary selection.... [Naturalists might seek to avoid this last claim by appealing to the following principle:]

(CP) In general, when a mental event m is either identical with or supervenient upon a physical event p, if p is such that it contributes to survival and evolutionary success, then, if m is relevant to an accurate mental representation of the world, m makes a positive contribution to such representation.

This correlation principle is not the result of natural selection; it is required in order to make an epistemically successful process of natural selection possible.... But CP amounts to a pre-established harmony which cannot be accepted by naturalism.

There are two claims here that I will contest.

My first observation, unsurprisingly, is that identity theorists do not accept that claim that mental events have no causal consequences. By the lights of identity theorists, given that mental events just are neural events, and given that it is unproblematic that neural events have causal consequences, it is not true that mental events are invisible to evolutionary selection. Given this observation, all the weight of Hasker’s argument, insofar as it is directed towards identity theorists, rests on the further argument about CP.
My second—perhaps more controversial—observation is that evolutionary naturalists who do not go in for eliminativism about the mental can be perfectly comfortable with the idea that something like representational content plays an important role in evolutionary explanations of the development of increasingly complex neural systems in biological organisms. It is because frogs’ neural states sufficiently accurately represent the world that, in appropriate environments, there is a significant correlation between frogs’ flicking out their tongues and the presence of things that provide sustenance to frogs. Moreover, that frogs’ neural states sufficiently accurately represent the world is a matter of those states having contents that are sufficiently accurately matched to the world. There is not a world of difference between the explanation of a frog’s catching a fly and the explanation of a baseballer’s catching a fly: in both cases, sufficiently accurate matching between the world and the contents of representational states plays a similar kind of role in the overall explanation.

The suggestion that commitment to CP requires a commitment to pre-established harmony is one that identity theorists will quite properly dismiss. It is never the case that we need a commitment to pre-established harmony to establish the identity of a thing with itself. We do not need a commitment to pre-established harmony to underwrite the claim that lightning is electrical discharge or that water is H₂O. Just so, we do not need a commitment to pre-established harmony to underwrite the claim that mental states and processes are neural states and processes.

HASKER (2001) contains a much more extended discussion of some of the claims that appear in HASKER (2013a). In particular, Chapter 3 of HASKER (2001), “Why the Physical Isn’t Closed”, provides an extended argument for the claim that the physical order is not causally closed, based on the further claim that rationality cannot be reduced to physical processes. Here, again, Hasker argues that evolutionary naturalists are stymied in their attempts to account for rationality because they are committed to the claim that mental states and processes are not causally effective.

One important difference between this argument and the one discussed above is that it is couched in terms of the physical rather than in terms of the natural. Given what I said earlier about scales and energy levels, I am happy to join Hasker in rejecting reductive micro-physicalism, and more generally, I am happy to join Hasker in rejecting reductive physicalism. While the study of some kinds of causal processes is the proper preserve of physics, there are other kinds of causal processes whose study is the proper preserve of
chemistry, biology, psychology, and so forth. However, of course, I am fully committed to the claim that the natural causal order is closed: I take it to be partly definitive of naturalism to suppose that there are none but natural causes.

As I have already noted, I insist that I am committed to the claim that mental states and processes are causally effective. Further, I am committed to the claim that the representational contents of neural states are relevant to causal explanations of behaviour that appeal to those states. In Chapter 2 of HASKER (2001), there is an argument against the form of “identity theory” provided in Kim (1993). However, it should be noted that Hasker’s objection to Kim is that Kim’s theory makes mental states epiphenomenal, in the following sense: mental states only have causal efficacy in virtue of their physical properties, and not in virtue of their mental properties. But the identity theory that I endorse is not vulnerable to this line of criticism: as I noted above, on my view, the representational contents of neural states are relevant to causal explanations of behaviour that appeal to those states.

10. FURTHER COMMENTS ON HASKER

Apart from our disagreement on the question of the existence of God, it seems to me that the biggest point on which Hasker and I disagree is on the prospects for naturalistic evolutionary accounts of reason. While I do not have any particular stake in disputes about different conceptions of God, I find much to admire in his books that discuss questions about divine attributes: e.g., HASKER (1998c, 2004, 2008b, 2013b, 2016d). Similarly, I find much to admire in his papers that address these kinds of questions: e.g. HASKER (1988, 1998a, 1998b, 2002, 2008a, 2010, 2016b). This admiration extends even to some of his book reviews: e.g. HASKER (1991, 1993a, 1994).

One cluster of issues that has some connection to discussion of anti-naturalistic arguments from reason concerns evolutionary theory, intelligent design, and the bearing of revealed truth on natural science. In his discussion of these matters—in, for example, HASKER (1992, 1993b, 2009)—Hasker’s views are much closer to my own than are the views of a great many theistic philosophers who write on these topics. Unlike some of the objections discussed above, Hasker’s objection to evolutionary naturalism does not turn on jejune misunderstandings of contemporary evolutionary theorising. Unlike some of the authors discussed above, Hasker does not make naïve estima-
tions about the prospects for theistic evolutionary science or theistic science in general. Unlike Taylor, Moreland and Plantinga—but perhaps like Balfour and Lewis—Hasker's primary concern is with the location of mind in a naturalistic worldview, rather than with the location of mind in an evolutionary naturalistic worldview. But, of course, if you cannot have a naturalistic worldview, then, in particular, you cannot have an evolutionary naturalistic worldview. If considerations about reason show that you cannot have a naturalistic worldview, then considerations about reason show that you cannot have an evolutionary naturalistic worldview.

Another cluster of issues that has some connection to discussion of anti-naturalistic arguments from reason concerns relationships between philosophy and religion, and, in particular, between philosophy and Christianity. Hasker (2016, 37) writes:

Our aim in philosophy should be the truth, and while not all truths are equal in value and importance, truth is undervalued if we suppose that only those truths are worth knowing that have become an issue for the life of the Christian church.

This seems to me to be broadly right. We should hope that, at least in the very long run, there will be independent convergence of expert opinion on philosophical issues. Moreover, I think, we should suppose that, no matter what the subject matter, if there is independent global convergence of expert opinion, the best bet is to take this to be convergence on truth. However, just before the lines cited above, Hasker also writes:

We certainly should applaud [the] call … for Christian philosophers to attend to the sorts of philosophical issues and questions that are pertinent specifically to the concerns of the Christian community.

I am not so sure about this. Imagine a similar call for Christian scientists to attend to the sorts of scientific issues and questions that are pertinent specifically to the concerns of the Christian community. Even if there are scientific issues and questions that are pertinent specifically to the concerns of Christian communities, it is not clear that we should be happy to countenance Christian scientists paying particular attention to those issues and questions. Given the way the world is, that could, for example, be a recipe for allocating disproportionately inadequate resources to seeking cures for malaria. But, if that is so in the case of science, why should it not also be so in the case of philosophy? There are, of course, important differences be-
between science and philosophy; nonetheless, it seems reasonable to think that, in both cases, we would prefer investment that is plausibly going to be to the benefit of all. Philosophy, no less than science, is an enterprise that belongs to humanity, rather than to any particular sect or cult.

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ANTI-NATURALISTIC ARGUMENTS FROM REASON


ANTI-NATURALISTIC ARGUMENTS FROM REASON

Summary

This paper discusses a wide range of anti-naturalistic argument from reason due to Balfour, Haldane, Joad, Lewis, Taylor, Moreland, Plantinga, Reppert, and Hasker. I argue that none of these arguments poses a serious challenge to naturalists who are identity theorists. Further, I argue that some of these arguments do not even pose prima facie plausible challenges to naturalism. In the concluding part of my discussion, I draw attention to some distinctive differences between Hasker’s anti-naturalistic arguments and the other anti-naturalistic arguments mentioned above.

Keywords: evolution; identity theory; naturalism; reason; self-defeat; theism.

ANTI-NATURALISTYCZNE ARGUMENTY Z ROZUMU

Streszczenie

Autor omawia wybrane antynaturalistyczne argumenty z rozumu, proponowane przez takich myślicieli, jak Balfour, Haldane, Joad, Lewis, Taylor, Moreland, Plantinga, Reppert i Hasker. Jak utrzymuje, żaden z tych argumentów nie stanowi poważnego wyzwania dla naturalistów, którzy są zwolennikami teorii identyczności. Co więcej, twierdzi, że niektóre z nich nie stanowią nawet przekonujących wyzwań dla naturalizmu wziętego w ogólności. W końcowej części tekstu autor zwraca uwagę na pewne wyraźne różnice między antynaturalistycznymi argumentami Williama Haskera a pozostałymi argumentami omawianymi w artykule.

Słowa kluczowe: ewolucja; teoria identyczności; naturalizm; samo-obalanie; rozum; teizm.